TRANSFORMING
SURGE CAPACITY
UN/INGO COLLABORATION

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Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Introduction

Collaborative partnerships for the deployment of surge capacity have existed within the United Nations (UN) for many years, yet this collaborative approach has not yet broadened out systematically to include many mainstream International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO), and opportunities could be missed. The Transforming Surge Capacity Project (TSCP) has recognised the enormous and critical role the UN plays within humanitarian response and has identified an opportunity to further explore INGOs' and International Organisations' (IO) surge engagement with the UN.

Key Findings

Many organisations choose to collaborate with the UN through the deployment of staff, either to work directly for a UN agency, within a Cluster, in support of the entire humanitarian community, or to work alongside as bolt-on support. Some organisations have been chosen as the UN's preferred partner, for roster management or for deployments on a cost recovery basis, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) or Danish Refugee Council (DRC). What all mechanisms have in common, is that each has developed through the identification by INGOs, NGOs and UN agencies, either separately or together, of a gap in the system which needed to be filled, and where organisations identified that collaboration and partnership would plug the gap most effectively.

Many of the mechanisms detailed here, began in the early 1990s and have been tweaked, and honed over time to become what they are today. Organisations have learnt from existing mechanisms, and applied that knowledge to the development of new surge mechanisms, and to minimise reinventing the wheel. As the humanitarian community shifts its focus on localised surge, there are opportunities to create new mechanisms modelled on those which work elsewhere or opportunities to think outside of the box and develop new models. There are also existing mechanisms which, whilst they are operating, require further refinement.

INGOs are already collaborating with the UN, from co-leading the Education Cluster, to participating in Global Cluster Units and / or Rapid Response Mechanisms through the secondment of staff to work full-time on Global Cluster initiatives. The range of partners within Global Clusters brings knowledge, experience and operational expertise, creating a more rounded Cluster, but the full-time input required is challenging for organisations to staff, when they, themselves are understaffed. The Global Clusters have often had changes in staff from seconded organisations, which, whilst change brings new ideas and experience, is challenging from a management perspective.

The Standby Partnership (SBP) includes 14 UN agencies and 48 partners, from NGO, INGO, governmental and private sector organisations, developed through 26 years of partnership. Secondments of staff across a range of profiles, were once undertaken on a transactional basis, where partners simply staffed the UN in accordance with the UN's request. Now, partners create posts in collaboration with UN agencies or Clusters, and work together with the UN to build capacity in specific areas. UN agencies have opened their training to candidates from partners' rosters, to ensure that secondees are able to hit the ground running. The SBP created a cross partnership Training Secretariat, which has, amongst other things, developed a competency framework for secondees, works with partners to improve their recruitment and selection processes and facilitates partners training courses. The SBP has recently also created a cross partnership Support Coordinator, to aid the partnership to move forward on issues of common concern, such as duty of care, processes and consultation; in areas which historically the SBP has struggled to move forward for the lack of capacity.

Team Mechanisms have tended to follow the same model, with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) born from the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and the need for search and rescue coordination and the Emergency Medical Teams (EMTs) initiative learning from INSARAG and their model of development of standards and peer classification. The Global Outbreak and Alert Network (GOARN) with its 600 partners worldwide, focuses again on protocols to ensure standards are maintained. Where INSARAG, GOARN and EMTs are specialist in nature, UNDAC is more generalist, bridging the gap between disaster management and the humanitarian sphere, but where its capacity in disaster management far outstrips their humanitarian capacity, and where input from the INGO community would be welcomed.

Where new or niche capacity was needed, partnerships and surge models were developed to fill that gap along thematic, as opposed to generalist lines, and at times, with an interagency objective. Interagency mechanisms have included the Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap), the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) and the Cash and Markets Capacity Building Roster (CashCap). Others have developed as hybrid models, where NGOs, such as MapAction and ACAPs were created specifically to fill a gap, unlike other organisations who existed previously, such as Save the Children or NRC, where they expanded their work to collaborate with the UN, in Clusters, the SBP and Rapid Response Mechanisms. These organisations perform the role of surge service providers, are small, innovative and agile, and seek to create an enabling environment in humanitarian response, both working alongside UN operations, or in standalone projects. In 2016, the Humanitarian 2 Humanitarian (H2H) Network was formed, of which there are currently 30 members, including ACAPs and MapAction, who offer services to the humanitarian community, innovate, collaborate, create enabling environments and build capacity.

The Transforming Surge Capacity Project agencies, apart from Save the Children, have had limited collaboration with UN agencies to date, due largely to not having enough human resource capacity to make releasing staff to UN agencies a viable option. Recently, the Start Network has established platforms in Pakistan, the Philippines and Bangkok, at present as a staff sharing tool between INGOs and NGOs within the region, but with the eventual concept of opening this out to collaboration with UN agencies.

In the context of surge, collaboration between INGOs and the UN is generally one way, with INGOs seconding staff to work in UN agencies. This research found no evidence of UN staff being surged into INGOs, nor did respondents raise this as an option. Benefits gained from INGOs and UN staff working together, such as cross-fertilisation of ideas and a greater understanding of each other's operations, were obtained when staff were seconded from INGOs into UN operations, and not vice versa. UN agencies are quick to capitalise on INGOs' identification and understanding of "new" areas, such as Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) or cash transfer programming (CTP), where INGOs invest in building capacity to respond, only for subsequent UN involvement to slow down further development, and / or "poach" INGO or NGO staff. Respondents generally felt that the UN was behind the curve regarding specialist expertise that INGOs may require, and so surging from the UN into INGOs was unnecessary.

Respondents referred to UN (and INGO) recruitment of INGO and NGO staff, generally at the local level, which they perceive as "poaching", and an area which INGOs and NGOs would like the UN to address. Many INGOs have signed up to, or endorsed the Charter for Change (C4C)[1] which includes a series of 8 Commitments for signatories in how they work with and relate to national organisations. The Charter is aimed at INGOs and to date 29 have become signatories, and UN agencies have not been approached to sign up. One Commitment specifically states *''We will stop Undermining Local Capacity'''* which is intended to address the recruitment of national NGO staff during the first 6 months of an emergency, which is the period when they most need their trained and experienced staff. One way the C4C proposes to address this is through providing compensation to NNGOs when they recruit their staff. However, although many C4C signatories are trying to address their issue within their own policies and practices there is also recognition that this practice will not disappear. The TSCP will therefore need to look very carefully at these unintended impacts of collaboration, and review the push factors that entice staff to work for other organisations.

Three mechanisms were chosen for review within phase 2; UNDAC, sub-national clusters and working with the humanitarian leadership team, the Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). Proposals and recommendations within this section are not meant to address the full set of challenges that face each of these mechanisms, but to suggest small, collaborative projects and pilots between INGOs, IOs and the UN. The Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS) of UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), had already expressed an interest in more systematic humanitarian support within an UNDAC team and an initial concept and actions to be undertaken have already been developed.

[1] https://charter4change.org

Analysis and informants also pointed to a need at sub-national cluster level, where it was relatively easy to secure staff with the correct expertise at capital level, but where this was more challenging at sub-national level. In the context of both Pakistan and the Philippines, discussion has already begun on   sharing of staff via national rosters, which could be a mechanism for such support. However, roster managers were concerned about "poaching" of staff by the UN, especially where there are significant differences in staff pay, and where the commitments established in the Charter for Change may not compensate fully for loss of staff. In addition, both rosters already have a modus operandi and so changing direction would require internal approval.

Challenges within the humanitarian leadership team are well documented, and there is no one participant who is at fault; each context brings different actors, different understandings of the system, different skill-sets and personalities, which affect how well humanitarian leadership functions. Whilst the deployment of high level INGO staff to work with the RC/HC and the HCT has the possibility of making gains, especially in terms of operational planning, INGO and NGO understanding and engagement with the system, it should be recognised, that this is just one part of a system of collective responsibility and mutual accountability and that all actors should be part of the change.

Conclusions

Without partnerships and networks, many surge mechanisms would have been doomed to failure. Working collaboratively is time and resource intensive, and the level of investment has to be worth the outcome. Whilst outcomes may be improved, the investment to establish collaborative surge mechanisms can be high and resources must be dedicated to surge management, and not shoe-horned into "spare time".

Some of the areas which Start Network agencies should address if deploying as the Start Network, instead of as their individual agency is that of representation and authority, which is reliant on well defined Terms of Reference for deploying staff, as well as trust between organisations. In addition, organisations would need to ensure no "double-hatting" where deployees are working on behalf of the Start Network and their individual agency.

Surging staff into UN operations, can assist organisations to broaden their reach and understanding of emergencies, as well as improve the overall response. In addition, inter-agency deployments could dramatically reduce the amount of human resources needed, and prevent much duplication. The national and regional platforms of the TSCP have taken the first steps towards making that happen, and identification of redundancy (if any) within INGOs could further facilitate cross organisational surge, where secondees from one organisation bridge gaps and facilitate information exchange and understanding of ways of working between organisations.

Many of the newer partnerships in surge are humanitarian to humanitarian, for example, where ACAPS and the CDAC Networks' rosters and deployments are managed by NRC. The UN's partnerships are different, whereby the UN's partner are INGOs, private sector, governmental bodies, etc., who provide the UN with surge capacity. At present, UN and INGO collaboration in surge is generally one-sided, with staff secondment from INGOs and NGOs into the UN, but not vice-versa. Indeed, many NGOs fear "poaching" of staff by INGOs or the UN, and a Charter for Change (C4C) for NGOs and INGOs has been established with the principle of providing compensation to organisations who lose staff within responses, although the commitments do not prevent "poaching," and nor are UN agencies included.

Overall, 2 principal issues which arose, that of financial and human resources which would facilitate progress in surge, both internal to respondents' own organisations and in regard to collaboration with other organisations. The UN often has secretariats to help build partnerships in support of its own surge mechanisms, and the NGO and INGO community step into support, largely at no cost to the UN. Identifying sustainable funding will be critical to the Start Network if ay of the proposed mechanisms are to be pursued.

Building collaborative ways of working is incredibly resource intensive, which has been a limiting factor for INGOs and which is less of an issue with UN surge mechanisms, where secretariat functions have been funded by donors, partnerships established, methodologies developed and then deployments once more funded by donors. The greatest challenge, as always is a lack of predictable funding and resources to establish and maintain surge mechanisms.

Phase 1 – Recommendations

Collaboration works more effectively when there are resources dedicated to meet aims. Often, organisations have the best intention to collaborate, but financial and human resources aren't set aside to make it happen.

• As the Transforming Surge Capacity Project is coming to an end, TSCP organisations should urgently identify resources through which to take forward any of the recommendations proposed, and accepted in this research.

The TSCP members could add value in the majority of the surge mechanisms detailed, but many require long-term input, as detailed in this report, which would be beyond the reach of most TSCP organisations. In addition, some of the initiatives are already well established and staffed, and so opportunities for input were less. Two mechanisms stood out as having already been discussed, and where the UN had already expressed an interested in collaborating. Upon discussion with the international platform of the TSCP, the following recommendations were made;

• To investigate further collaboration, either within UNDAC as full UNDAC members or as a bolt-on service provider to the UNDAC system; and

• To investigate support to sub-national Clusters

These recommendations will be explored more throughly in phase 2 of this study, with a particular focus on local staff support to both mechanisms. Support to sub-national Clusters will be investigated in the Pakistan and the Philippines contexts where mechanisms for sharing staff have already been established.

In addition, a third area was identified, where the gain from collaboration was perceived to be substantial;

• Investigate the need for INGO leadership collaboration, taking into account existing mechanisms' Terms of Reference and support available to UN humanitarian response leadership. Any support would need to embed with UN led leadership, the RC/HC/HCT and the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM).

Whilst this paper concerns UN and INGO collaboration, one of the key areas which arose, was that of representation and presentation.

• Before proceeding with discussions, the TSCP should clarify whether any "offer" to collaborate with the UN on surge is as the Start Network, the TSCP or as individual Start Network agencies, and look at the implications of each, including representation, authority, coordination, etc., as well as on a more practical level, around recruitment processes, staff quality, training and standing operating procedures.

In addition to the areas of investigation which will be taken forward, TSCP organisations could collaborate with the UN through;

• Seconding staff into a Cluster or Area of Responsibility (AoR), either within a Rapid Response Team (RRT) on a long-term basis or for short-term input, similar to input via the Standby Partnership (SBP);

• Encouraging greater participation, including national NGOs, within the TRIPLEX simulation;

• Forming part of OCHA's emergency preparedness planning in the Asia region. There is an opportunity to ensure predictable support to emergencies through this process, through integrated resource planning, based on modelling of future emergencies and evidence of past emergencies in the region; and

• The creation of thematic rosters in "new" areas such as urban expertise, where the UN lacks expertise and where inter-agency support would be beneficial.

Finally, establishing links with the UN is not without risk of staff leaving their role to work directly for the organisation with which they were previously collaborating. Motivations for leaving can take many forms, most notably in the form of differential in pay levels between UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, but also for new challenges, better career prospects, family reasons, etc.

- Recognise that seconding staff into UN operations, may lead to staff leaving to work directly for the UN, and that attrition rates may be higher as a result. UN agencies are not signatories to the Charter for Change and are therefore not bound by the C4C ethical recruitment clause.

Phase 2 – Recommendations

UNDAC

To manage INGO deployments alongside UNDAC, the Start Network should;

- Establish interest from Start Network agencies, including the incorporation of INGO staff drawn from the country or region of operation, which is of particular interest to FCSS. Whilst FCSS is not specifically excluding staff drawn from British Start Network agencies, drawing on local staff capacity would meet both the humanitarian and local expertise required;

- Consider issues of representation and authority, whereby staff from individual Start Network agencies would represent the Start Network, as opposed to their employing organisation;

- Approach DFID and other donors with the concept of INGO support to UNDAC, with a view to identifying funding and / or roster management. For example, DFID pays UK UNDAC Member consultancy fees whilst deployed, as well as costs incurred by FCSS in arranging UK UNDAC Members' travel, accommodation and subsistence. CHASE OT staff manage the UK UNDAC roster on behalf of DFID and may also be able to manage Start Network participation;

- If funding, not available through DFID or other donors, establish how deployments will be funded[2];

- Establish a roster, whereby participant INGOs are on standby for UNDAC deployments for a defined time–period. This would spread responsibility for participating in missions across various INGOs, making participation less onerous, and therefore more practicable, especially for smaller INGOs with less human resources;

- If roster management not available through DFID or other donors, assign a roster manager within the Start Network. In addition to maintaining the roster, the roster manager would be responsible for maintaining relationships with INGOs, establishing duty of care procedures, establishing deployment guidance, facilitating attendance on prerequisite UNDAC training, monitoring and evaluating deployment results, and if, necessary, undertake financial management; and,

- Consider reporting lines for deployees

In addition to considerations for the Start Network, FCSS would also have to;

- Consider amendments to existing or the creation of initial and ongoing training on the UNDAC concept and methodology, considering the geographic spread of potential deployees and limiting participation costs;

- Work with the Start Network to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework for deployments; and,

- Communicate and clarify this concept with OCHA and IASC partners.

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[2] The UNDAC Advisory Board (February 2016) recommended the use of UNDAC mission accounts on a case by case basis and with prior consultation of the respective UNDAC member country, to support the participation of UNDAC members from participating IOs and NGOs in UNDAC missions.

RC/HC/HCT Collaboration

Both UN and non-UN informants recognise that there is a need, as evidenced in numerous studies on the challenges of humanitarian coordination, however there is no panacea, as each context will be different. Whilst there are undoubtedly areas that could be addressed through deployment, there are also activities that could be undertaken in advance of a response, and where failure to do so may perpetuate the challenges faced by the humanitarian leadership team;

• The Start Network should advocate for rationalisation, clarification and update of relevant guidance that underpins HCT management and operation. This could include greater clarity and clarifications around the role of INGOs and NGOs within the Humanitarian Country Team, possibly through the creation of stand-alone Terms of Reference, similar to those which exist for the RC/HC, DHC, IARRM and Cluster Leads and where responsibilities support those of the RC/HC in securing appropriate and sustainable participation of INGO and NGOs. All stakeholders should commit/re-commit to the roles and responsibilities established;

• Start Network agencies, and their national counterparts should actively engage with the HCT compact during the pilot, and assume HCT responsibilities as required of the context;

• The Start Network should investigate the concept of engagement in advance of emergencies through INGO/NGO participation in RC/HC retreats, an annual RC/HC – Humanitarian Director meeting and through coaching of responders as part of preparedness activities. This should include working with partners at country level to familiarise local actors on roles and responsibilities during a humanitarian response;

• The Start Network should advocate for INGO/NGO inclusion in the IHP led TRIPLEX exercise[3], with the objective of "testing" UN, INGO, IO and NGO collaboration. The next TRIPLEX is scheduled to take place in late 2019; and

• The Start Network could investigate a funding stream for the development of training / simulations on UN and INGO collaboration, or work with the Humanitarian Leadership Academy to identify ways to improve local NGO and INGO understanding of their roles and responsibilities within humanitarian response.

The deployment of senior level INGO staff should be perceived as support, and not attempt to take over roles, and nor should any deployment become an extra level of bureaucracy. Whilst respondents perceived there to be a role, there was no single area which stood out as being an easy win. Whichever way, if any, the Start Network chooses to collaborate with the humanitarian leadership team, there are numerous issues to consider;

• A generic Terms of Reference (ToR) should be developed, in coordination with the Humanitarian Leadership Support Unit and stakeholders in advance of deployment, covering the areas of understanding, participation, representation, bandwidth, communication, as well as prioritisation and planning, and allow for contextualisation upon deployment. The ToRs should not duplicate the activities included within other leadership team ToRs, but seek to be complementary;

• In coordination with the HLSU, the Start Network must identify whether support would always deploy, or deploy upon request only.

• Deployment activities should support and coach members of the HCT, rather than undertake their role, so as not to disempower participants and to build capacity for future response;

• Deployments should consider activities in advance, such as training and mentoring, combined with coaching, both during and post-deployment. There is already an HC mentoring programme managed by the HLSU, which may benefit from senior level INGO staff input;

• The Start Network could consider working with both ICVA and InterAction, in the establishment of this surge mechanism;

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[3] IHP organises TRIPLEX, which is a large scale field simulation exercise, focusing on strengthening preparedness and response coordination. The simulation includes IHP members, OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, the EU, NGOs and the IFRC. More information on TRIPLEX can be found here: http://www.ihp.nu/training

- Deployees should either be current members of the HC pool or have been assessed to meet the HC competencies[4]. This could be combined with undertaking some elements of the training/coaching available to HC pool applicants. As Start Network representatives, there will also need to be quality assurance of any staff that deploy;

- Consider the development of Principles of Partnership[5] with key stakeholders; and

- Where an HCT Compact exists, deployees should assist HCT members to review and revise as appropriate.

Recommendations for Sub-National Cluster Collaboration

Pakistan and the Philippines
- Identify whether partner organisations wish to support the UN at a sub-national Cluster level. As the rosters are relatively new, partners may decide that it is too soon to expand roster remit;

- If partners are interested in the concept of seconding staff into sub-national Clusters, in collaboration with the HCT, identify which Clusters, if any are regularly in need of support and where roster staff could add value. The duration of deployments may be prohibitive, given that a standard Cluster Coordinator or Sub-National Cluster Coordinator role within the SBP would be for a minimum of 3 months, and often requested for 6 months;

- Identify a funding stream through which to support such requests, including the possibility of cost recovery from the relevant Cluster;

- Investigate whether secondments will be stand-alone or whether a formal MOU between the sending organisation(s) and relevant UN agency will be required;

- Identify how deployments will be managed, standard operating procedures, duty of care etc. for staff seconded into sub-national Clusters; and

- In collaboration with the Humanitarian Country Team, assess current members against Cluster role competencies.

Pakistan
- Discuss a role for INGOs within sub-national Clusters with the HCT, the National Disaster Management Committee, the Prime Minister and other government ministries;

The Philippines
- Ensure a robust business case is established within the surge business model currently under development, for approval by the Steering Committee; and

- Assess both existing roster members and future roster members against the ASEAN ASCEND competency framework, as well as those established by the SBP Training Secretariat

The Start Network
- Consider the role of Start Network agencies within a response in support of the Pakistan and Philippines contexts, where NGO staff would deploy into sub-national clusters and INGO staff would backfill their positions within their home organisation.

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[4] https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/HC%20Competencies.pdf

[5] https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment

Transforming Surge Capacity – UN/INGO Collaboration – Phase 1

Introduction

Collaborative partnerships for the deployment of surge capacity have existed within the United Nations (UN) for many years, yet this collaborative approach has not yet broadened out systematically to include many mainstream International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO), and opportunities could be missed. The Transforming Surge Capacity Project (TSCP) has recognised the enormous and critical role the UN plays within humanitarian response and has identified an opportunity to further explore INGOs' and International Organisations' (IO) surge engagement with the UN.

Purpose of the Research

Phase 1 of this study will examine what surge/scaling up mechanisms exist between INGO's and the UN and Clusters, and to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in surge capacity. It will detail how the mechanisms operate, thematic areas they support, funding modalities and why they were established, as well as including an assessment of the benefits and challenges of each mechanism. In addition, this report will explore gaps in surge, possible alignments between how INGOs and UN agencies surge, how UN agencies work with each other and whether that creates an opportunity for collaboration, both between INGOs, and between INGOs and UN agencies.

Phase 2 will build on the information from phase 1 and assess whether UN/INGO collaboration would be possible across mechanisms of interest to the Transforming Surge Capacity Project and include recommendations for forming successful collaborations with the UN.

Methodology

This research focuses on surge of staff, as opposed to materiel, and was undertaken as a desk-based study, through 62 semi-structured interviews with organisations involved in surge deployments from the INGO, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), IO and UN sectors, as well as interviews with deployees[6] who have formed part of the surge mechanisms reviewed. Start Network agencies were chosen at random by Action Aid, and included those INGOs which were already known to collaborate with the UN. Research also included a review of relevant documents.

Mechanism Overview

The matrix below, details the initiatives to be explored within the first phase of this research, including selected Start Network organisations. Each section will include a summary of the mechanism, and where more in-depth description will be annexed to this report.

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[6] Generalised term used to describe surge staff

Mechanism Overview

The matrix below, details the initiatives to be explored within the first phase of this research, including selected Start Network organisations. Each section will include a summary of the mechanism, and where more in-depth description will be annexed to this report.

Initiative	Which NGOs / IOs involved	Collaborating with	Purpose	Est
Start Network Organisations (1)				
TSCP Pakistan Platform	Islamic Relief, Care International, Plan International, International Medical Corps (IMC), Save the Children, Tearfund, Muslim Aid, ACT, Mercy Corp	OCHA	To share resources, policies and planning documents to facilitate the scale up of local surge capacity, including the development of a shared roster	
TSCP Philippines Platform	Islamic Relief, Care International, Plan International, International Medical Corps (IMC), Save the Children, Tearfund, Muslim Aid, ACT, Mercy Corp	OCHA		2016
TSCP Bangkok Platform	Action Aid, Christian Aid, Care, Muslim Aid, Islamic Relief, Save the Children, Plan International	OCHA		
CARE International	–	None at present	–	–
Plan International	–	None at present	–	–
World Vision International (WVI)	–	National level Clusters and sub-national Clusters	To work collaboratively with the UN to improve humanitarian outcomes	–
Standby Partnership (SBP)				
–	See Annex 1	See Annex 1	To support UN agencies responding to humanitarian emergencies throughout the world via the secondment of gratis personnel	1991

[6] Generalised term used to describe surge staff

Initiative	Which NGOs / IOs involved	Collaborating with	Purpose	Est
Surge to Global Clusters				
Global Education Cluster	Save the Children	UNICEF	To support Global Clusters in preparedness and response through the secondment of personnel	2007
Global Shelter Cluster	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)	UNHCR IOM	To support Global Clusters in preparedness and response through the secondment of personnel	2006
Rapid Response Team / Field Support Team (RRT/FST)	Action Against Hunger (AAH) International, Action contre la Faim (ACF), Finnish Church Aid (FCA), IMC US, IMPACT, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – NORCAP, Oxfam GB, Save – Denmark, Norway, Sweden, UK, Solidarités International, World Vision Canada, World Vision International	UNICEF	To support Global Clusters in preparedness and response through the secondment of personnel	2007 onwards
Roaming Emergency GBV Advisers (REGAs)	NRC	UNFPA	To support Global Clusters in preparedness and response through the secondment of personnel	2014
Team Surge Mechanisms				
International Search and Rescue Group (INSARAG)	Specialist search and rescue NGOs	OCHA INSARAG Members	INSARAG aims to establish minimum international standards for Urban Search And Rescue (USAR) teams and methodology for international coordination in earthquake response	1991
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC)	The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), MapAction, Télécoms Sans Frontières (TSF)	OCHA	To ensure UNDAC is able to provide services in telecommunications, emergency logistics, environmental expertise and mapping	1993
Emergency Medical Team (EMT)	UK–Med (UK EMT only) Most are governmental teams	WHO OCHA	As a network to ensure EMTs are quality assured for rapid deployment, as well as to ensure coordination and collaboration of EMTs	2011

Initiative	Which NGOs / IOs involved	Collaborating with	Purpose	Est
Hybrid Models				
ACAPs	ACF, NRC, Save the Children (Governance Structure) Collaborates with over 40 organisations including academic institutions, Clusters, humanitarian organisations, INGOs, regional bodies, research centres and UN agencies		The purpose of collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is for recruitment and management of ACAPS staff and roster	2009
MapAction	CartONG, MapAction, iMMAP, ACAPs, REACH, Save the Children and others	OCHA WFP UNICEF IFRC	MapAction collaborates with others to enable humanitarian assistance to be delivered more effectively more quickly	2002
Thematic Surge				
Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network	Full list available here: www.cdacnetwork.org/about-the-network/members/ Any Standby Partner (SBP) can second staff with a CDAC focus into requesting UN agencies, but most go through NRC	International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO)	The CDAC Network's purpose is to bring together diverse local, regional and global actors to catalyse communities' ability to connect, access information and have a voice in humanitarian emergencies	2012
The Cash and Markets Capacity Building Roster (CashCap)	NRC Standby Partners (participation in training and mentoring)	UN agencies, integrated missions, national authorities and INGO networks	To train and mentor experts in cash transfer programming (CTP) in support of organisations within the humanitarian community	2014
The Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap)	NRC	Humanitarian Coordinator, Humanitarian Country Teams, UN agencies Cluster leads, NGOs and governments.	To facilitate and strengthen capacity and leadership of humanitarians to undertake and promote gender equality programming to ensure the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men of all ages, are taken into account in humanitarian action at global, regional, and country levels.	2007

Initiative	Which NGOs / IOs involved	Collaborating with	Purpose	Est
Thematic Surge				
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)	Information here: www.who.int/ihr/alert_and_response/outbreak-network/en/	WHO Member States	Is to harness international resources through the GOARN network, at the request of affected WHO Member States to augment their response to ongoing or potential public health emergencies	2000
Joint Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Profiling Service (JIPs)	Danish Refugee Council (DRC), HelpAge International, NRC, ACAPS, REACH, CartONG, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)	UNHCR	To support government, humanitarian and development actors design and implement collaborative profiling exercises, primarily in situations of internal displacement	2009
The Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap)	NRC, Standby Partners	Humanitarian Coordinator, UNHCR, UNICEF, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), OCHA, or other agencies with a particular protection mandate	As an interagency initiative to build capacity in the humanitarian protection response, through support to strategic and operational humanitarian protection response for IDPs and vulnerable populations	2005
Supporting UNHCR Resources on the Ground with Experts on mission (SURGE)	International Rescue Committee (IRC)	UNHCR	To create a roster of highly qualified junior-level protection professionals for deployment to UNHCR field offices in non-emergency settings	2001

Start Network Agencies

CARE International

CARE has a Rapid Response Team (RRT) of 20 staff, which, whilst this number has grown in recent years, they feel this is low compared to other organisations and would like this to increase to 35 people. In addition, CARE manages a roster of approximately 400 internal people to CARE, former CARE or freelance consultants. CARE's first call for staffing is the RRT, followed by the roster and then through networks. At present, approximately 40% of posts are filled via RRT, 40% via the roster and 20% through other means.

At present, CARE does not surge staff into UN operations in either a formal or informal route, but would be open to this if resourcing permits. CARE has a Gender in Emergencies (GiE) roster, for which discussions have begun on sharing staff with peer agencies, which could include UN agencies, as part of the START collaboration and funding on a pilot training for GiE Advisers. This initiative could be complementary to GenCap.

Plan International

During emergencies, Plan International draws upon staff from across the organisation to respond and like CARE, Plan International would like this core surge capacity to increase. Again, this means that there is no formal arrangement for surging staff into the UN, but they would be open to look at this on a case by case basis. An example of this would be where Plan International does not have a presence in Kurdish Iraq, and deployment to support the Protection Cluster may be useful for both entities.

Plan International believes that surging staff from INGOs into the UN would be of mutual benefit, most notably within Clusters. Resources again would be a limiting factor, but a rotational mechanism of support from various INGOs may be possible. Again, if funding were to allow, Plan International would be keen to explore how they could engage at co-lead level. Collaborating within Clusters would increase the visibility of INGOs and facilitate the inclusion of local NGOs, who may at present find participating within Clusters intimidating. In addition, INGO presence within Clusters may bring the operational experience the UN sometimes lacks and where INGOs and local NGO counterparts bring on the ground knowledge, information and experience. Shared responsibility within Clusters may also facilitate greater access to funding.

Another area in which Plan International feels there may be a possibility to engage, is within an UNDAC mission, where they feel that INGO staff inclusion would be useful, supporting assessments, writing Flash Appeals and setting up the Clusters, where required. For Plan International, working with an UNDAC mission may be possible given the short duration of UNDAC missions, and again a possible rotational mechanism, whereby INGO staff are on call at certain times of the year, may make that mechanism workable for more INGOs, including smaller INGOs who have much to offer, but who are more resource constrained than bigger INGOs. Plan International also feels they could have capacity to support UN operations, with information management capacity, in compiling programme data, needs assessments results and analysis on behalf of the Cluster. Both the UNDAC mechanism and Global Cluster surge is discussed later in this paper.

Plan International recognised that the UN could offer more to INGOs, NGOs and IOs, especially in regard to training within the humanitarian architecture, which is UN led. It is rare that UN agencies and the NGO community train together in preparedness for response and that there could be the opportunity of accessing ECHO Enhanced Response Capacity funding to undertake regional and national level simulations, including the UN, INGO, IO and NGO communities, to test ways of working.

The International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) organises a simulation every 3 years, called TRIPLEX, which is a large-scale field simulation exercise, focusing on strengthening preparedness and response coordination. The simulation includes IHP members, OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, the EU, NGOs and the IFRC. INGOs are invited to attend each year, although it is not clear how decisions are made regarding who to invite. In addition, once invited, participation is patchy.

Plan also recognised that UNHAS provides a great service to the NGO community.

Save the Children

Various Save the Children member organisations support the UN, most notably through RRTs and support to Global Clusters, and in co-leading the Education Cluster, which are detailed later.

As one of the bigger INGOs, Save the Children has access to a larger pool of standing capacity than smaller organisations. Standing capacity pools, which as well as including programme administration and management staff, may also include senior level staff who have worked in the humanitarian sphere for many years and who have engaged at high level during responses. Save the Children is currently developing a virtual global roster to map this expertise across all members, with the intention of being able to more easily access the right expertise from other members, as well as to establish redundancy of members, which could be utilised either to fill gaps in other members' programmes, or could, in the future be opened-up to other INGOs, NGOs, IOs, UN Agencies, donors etc. on a cost recovery basis. An example of this in practice, could be support to OCHA's Associate Surge Pool (ASP),

Discussion with Save the Children led to 2 ideas for possible utilisation of senior level humanitarian INGO staff, such as Humanitarian Directors;

•   As operational planners in support of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), enabling the response; and

•   As (Deputy) Humanitarian Coordinators in the first 1-3 months of an emergency, working alongside an RC, leading the HCT

Save the Children felt that the timeframe of 1-3 months, would be possible, at least for larger INGOs to release senior staff, although there was a difference of opinion as to the utility of such a short deployment. One interviewee felt that 1-3 months would also be more acceptable to some senior level staff, who will already have spent a long time overseas in their career, often in challenging environments, and who may now also have families. However, another respondent noted that some senior level staff deploy overseas on a long-term basis, and that it was, in some ways, to be accepted as part of working in the humanitarian sphere.

Benefits to INGO	Benefits to the UN/Humanitarian Response
Prestige (or disrepute)	Adds operational capacity and perspective
Keeps senior staff operational	Brings fresh ideas to the system
Helps build relationships with the UN and affected governments	Brings greater knowledge of the INGO community
Brings back greater knowledge of the UN	Enables a more balanced response (UN – INGO – NGO)
Maintains skills	–

The concept of high level support to a response is not new; in 2013, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) developed the concept of the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM) as part of the Transformative Agenda (TA). The IAARM provides the deployment of senior level staff within 72 hours of the start of an L3 emergency to work in inter-agency coordination. These experts work within and through their organisations under the direction of the HC, in support of the HCT goal of an effective response[7].

The concept proposed, would need to ensure that it dovetailed with the Terms of Reference of a RC/HC, a Deputy HC (DHC), and the IARRM, as well as considering any support offered to RC/HCs and the HCT through OCHA's Peer to Peer Support Team, where senior level UN and NGO peers, work with HCs and HCTs to strengthen the response and undertake Operational Peer Reviews (OPR)[8].

Whilst fulfilling a high-level role in a response, and performing well adds an element of prestige to the INGO, this input is not without its risks, and the perception, or actuality of a job done poorly, could impact negatively on the INGO. Deployment durations must be realistic enough to achieve gains in responses, and also practicable for organisations to release staff; continual change of staff and the lack of institutional memory should be avoided. Finally, Start Network agencies would need to trust that those charged with this role, represent the Start Network, and not their organisation alone, and that their participation is neutral.

World Vision International (WVI)

As a federated organisation, country offices are independent, but support emergencies with staff with different specialisms. For Level 3 emergencies, WVI calls upon its Global RRT to support the national office. In "downtime", deployees work to improve practices, undertake technical activities and assist in the development of policies and procedures. WVI currently has 42 members in its Global RRT and 20-30 based in 6 regions (120+). Global RRT members deploy for up to 6 months per year, usually for 2-3 months at a time and Regional RRT members are released a maximum of once per year for 2-3 months.

As with many INGOs, and despite WVI being a large organisation, human resources to support other organisations are scarce. Despite this, WVI has co-chaired Clusters at the national level and led Clusters at sub-national level. The challenge for WVI in supporting Clusters is funding as they are required to allocate funding in advance. Support to sub-national Clusters is often required in protracted crises, where WVI does not have spare funding. This leads to WVI funding their own critical posts first, before considering support to Clusters. There are some sectors for which WVI staff are more utilised than others, and so there could be an opportunity for utilising less called upon WVI surge in support of other organisations, however via a cost recovery basis would be preferable.

National and Regional Platforms

As part of the Transforming Surge Capacity Project, the regional platform in Bangkok and the national platforms in Pakistan and the Philippines have all established rosters for deployment of staff either across organisation or across countries. Roster members include staff from NGOs, INGOs, Haiyan responders no longer under contract, doctors and other humanitarian personnel.

Each roster is interacting with the UN to varying degrees. The Pakistan platform has had initial discussions with OCHA regarding possible surge support to OCHA. Both organisations feels that the roster could best support the UN at the provincial and district level as there are already well functioning Clusters at national level, and OCHA highlighted that they do not have technical specialists to manage Clusters as the sub-national level. The Pakistan roster works with 9 INGOs and a further 26 NGOs participate in their shared roster.

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[7] https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda

[8] Also: Sharing learning and best practice about complex crises with humanitarian practitioners and leaders, based on practical examples from field operations. This includes the monthly STAIT webinar series and Informing policy processes as appropriate, based on information collected from the field

In Bangkok, at the regional platform level, the roster and UN system are engaged to a greater level, with the OCHA regional office and the platform in contact regularly, and where OCHA staff regularly participate in regional platform events and participated in a recent simulation. Roster members participating in the simulation, identified that they need to strengthen their skills in liaising with UN agencies (and vice versa), but as the simulation only took place recently, it is not yet clear whether, and how that will be addressed. OCHA believes that the regional roster will create a community of frontline surge with whom they can engage and build relationships. This is especially important in the Asian context, where there is pressure for responders to be drawn from within Asia. In addition, OCHA has been considering how to incorporate more INGO members within UNDAC teams, to provide links to civil society.

Representatives from OCHA in the Asia region highlight that much has been learnt since from recent emergencies; countries have built their response capacity and are looking to restrict entry to the quantity needed, rather than the quantity offered. In Indonesia, for example, they are working on modelling emergencies and estimating needs, funded by DFAT, Australia. Work is underway on community engagement, asking people what they would need in an emergency, how it should be delivered (cash / in-kind), who should receive the support and on developing accountability mechanisms. An assessment is being undertaken of local response capacities and what would be required at what stage of the emergency, with a view to seeking assurances from providers (UN, INGO, NGO, private sector, etc.) on what they could deliver and to identify what human resources would be needed to support the response at each level. Only then, would it be necessary to look at who should deploy, in what capacity, where to and for how long. At all times, it is necessary to ensure that national capacity is not overrun by incoming international staff. DFID, for example, has priority preparedness countries in which the TSCP could work closely in implementing surge models.

In the Philippines, the roster has capitalised on post-Haiyan momentum and long-existing collaboration between Philippine INGOs and the UN system, called the PINGON, which includes 7 Start Network members.[9] The On Call Surge Philippines shared roster has 7 members, both INGO and NGO, and aims to increase to 9 member organisations. Current members include Action Against Hunger, A Single Drop of Safe Water (NGO), Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, National Secretariat for Social Action (NGO), Tearfund, and VSO International. The roster is overseen by a Steering Committee comprising of both NGO and INGO members.

This INGO/UN collaboration is facilitating greater engagement of local NGOs within this network, with a view to fostering better NGO participation in an emergency response. As with the Pakistan platform, the Philippines platform has met with OCHA to discuss the roster, and there is a belief that it too could work at local level, where the Cluster approach at national level works well, but where the UN systems lacks technical expertise for the sub-national, provincial and district level. As with the Indonesia example, OCHA is supporting preparedness planning, where it is envisaged that local capacity and interoperability will be critical and this could be where the roster has the possibility of supporting targeted and coordinated support to emergencies.

Each platform has made inroads in discussing INGO and UN collaboration in surge, but this has not yet materialised into anything concrete, given platforms' focus on roster development for deployment across NGOs. There is, however, appetite from both sides to investigate further how NGO staff could participate from within their rosters and could add value to the humanitarian system. In the Asian context, and where countries such as Indonesia and Philippines have learnt lessons from the tsunami in 2004, and Typhoon Haiyan, consideration should be given around surge to work closely with governments to ensure that surge does not overwhelm existing capacity, and that any surge is looked at holistically between the government, INGOs, NGOs, IOs and the UN as part of preparedness initiatives.

[9] Action Against Hunger, CARE, Muslim Aid, Save the Children, Plan International, Christian Aid and Tearfund

The Standby Partnership (SBP)

The Standby Partnership (SBP) is a network of NGOs, governmental and private sector organisations who maintain rosters of humanitarian experts, "secondees" for secondment to UN operations worldwide. Each Standby Partner holds Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with UN agencies which detail the responsibilities of the sending and receiving organisation, as well as an undertaking which is signed by the secondee. Secondees are considered type II gratis personnel or "Experts on Mission" under General Assembly Resolution 51/243[10]. Deployments are usually for a minimum of 3 months. The MOUs that UN agencies hold with partners often form the backbone of many of the surge mechanisms discussed within this paper, most notably within Global Clusters.

The SBP began in 1991, in response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, when the UN needed to rapidly scale up its humanitarian resources. There are currently 48 standby partners, some of which offer broad humanitarian capacity and others which offer specialists, such as information management or telecommunications experts. Governmental partners include the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), DFID, Irish Aid, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) and Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), of which 3 (DEMA, DFID and MSB) are also members of the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP)[11]. NGOs within the partnership include CANADEM, DRC, NRC/NORCAP and RedR Australia, and the private sector includes Veolia and Ericsson, of which the latter also works closely with the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC). Partners invest much time, money and effort in recruitment, training and retention of database members, not only recruiting in their home nations, but in the Global South. Many secondees are on multiple partners' databases, undergoing multiple costly induction and training courses. A partner matrix listing participant UN agencies and partners can be found in Annex 1.

UN organisations rely on the SBP mechanism heavily to fill posts. In 2016, these organisations utilised the SBP as follows;

Agency	SBP Deployments	SBP Days	SBP as % of all surge	Agency %	Cluster %	RRT %	Other %
OCHA (1)	58	7,014	42	100	–	–	–
UNICEF (2)	247	32,533	N/A	50	29	12	9
IOM	38	4,388	Not Available	87	13	–	–
FAO	21	3,765	Not Available	N/A	N/A	–	–
WHO (3)	30	6,390	Not Available	42	58	–	–

(1) There were 56 deployments (37%) via OCHA's Internal Emergency Response Roster (ERR), 27 (19%) via the Associate Surge Pool (ASP) and 3 (2%) were Roaming Emergency Surge Officers (RESOs)

(2) Equates to 89 full time staff, quantified as $16 million of staff in kind

(3) 213 months multiplied by 30 days

The SBP broadens the definition of surge identified in the 2007 People in Aid Surge Capacity in the Humanitarian Relief and Development Sector report[12] and used subsequently in the 2015[13] report. Whilst many deployments are for rapid deployment, such as Typhoon Haiyan, many agencies and partners use them for longer-term and / or more strategic engagement. The presence of an MOU creates opportunities for engagement outside of the traditional meaning of surge.[14] The types of engagement are distinguished as transactional (rapid surge) and transformational (strategic engagement) within the SBP community.

[10] http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r243.htm

[11] More information on the IHP http://www.ihp.nu

[12] http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Resources/Articles-and-Research/surge-capacity-in-the-humanitarian-and-development-sector.pdf

[13] http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Resources/Articles-and-Research/Surge-Humanitarian-Report-Final.pdf

[14] Example MOU https://www.unicef.org/cholera/Chapter_6_preparedness/12_UNICEF_Standby_Guidelines.pdf

Examples of transformational engagement include Roaming Emergency Gender Based Violence Advisers (REGAs), based regionally in preparedness, with the remit to deploy as a first responder, and the Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) or the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) rosters and secondments;

Partners are responsible for funding and administering to secondments, with UN responsibilities generally limited to providing office space, equipment and support, issuing the secondee with an identification card, paying for business travel and affording the secondee a supervisor. UN agencies can request secondees for their agency or the Cluster they lead or co-lead.

Strengths of the SBP Mechanism	SBP Deployments
Secondees faster to deploy in general than UN recruitment (Average 25 days in 2016)	Multiple rosters holding the same candidates, which is not cost effective
Assumed to be good value for money. For the UN, this is a free resource, for partners, secondees are not paid the same benefits and entitlements as UN staff	Where partners have the "perfect' candidate, but not the funding or vice versa – generally results in the UN not being able to select the "perfect" candidate
Provides technical expertise not present within the UN agency	Quality of secondees proposed and deployed can vary (but there is no evidence to support them being any worse or better than UN internal redeployments)
Anecdotally, secondees bring fresh blood to the UN system	There is no mechanism to assess outcome or impacts of secondments. Reporting is generally focused on deployment days rather than secondment outcomes
Secondees are able to influence the performance of UN agencies	The performance evaluation system, whilst improved in recent years, in general, is not providing partners with the means to address secondees' performance
Flexible mechanism, improving choice of secondee for the UN agency	Partners can take time to recruit "new" profiles such as Cash Coordination or Community Engagement (but there is little or no evidence that this is faster or slower than UN agencies recruiting their own staff to these profiles)
Partners can utilise the SBP mechanism transformationally, working with UN agencies in specific areas, to build capacity e.g. ProCap or the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS)	Partners and UN agencies reaching consensus on strategic direction is challenging
Secondees are able to access UN training so that they are better prepared for deployments	It can be perceived as supporting the UN's poor staff planning
The partnership has enabled innovation, such as the SBP Training Secretariat, which works cross UN agency and partner to maximise secondees' deployment potential	Funding to partners for secondees in "forgotten" emergencies is difficult
The quantity of partners affords the UN access to a vast number of skilled personnel	Exit strategies and handovers can be weak, with secondees unable to handover work at the end of their deployment
The SBP facilitates best practice and creates a support mechanism for partners experiencing the same challenges	There is much duplication of effort by partners in the selection of secondees

A standard SBP "transactional" secondment, whereby the UN requests secondees for 3 months or more, does not, in general fit the INGO profile, due to the lack of internal human resources to staff roles for this length of time. Most INGOs who participate in this mechanism via the SBP MOUs are supporting the "transformational" element, primarily through Global Clusters and offering thematic surge opportunities, which are detailed in subsequent sections. For example, both DRC and NRC's programmes are separate to their support through the SBP. Rarely do both organisations utilise their own programme staff for secondments into the UN, separate funding and rosters are maintained for that purpose. Whilst seconding staff into UN operations would help INGOs and Its to increase their geographical footprint and provide them with access to information from responses in which they are not currently present, they would be unable to influence the secondee's work to meet the needs of the home organisation. The spirit of SBP MOUs is that seconding partners are unable to direct the work of secondees, who become de facto UN staff for the period of their secondment.

P3/P4[15] secondees make up the bulk of secondees into the UN, but there may be an opportunity for INGOs to second high level (P5) staff into key areas within a response, including the RC/HC support or HCT roles mentioned earlier. However, the issue remains as to whether INGOs could spare a high-level member of staff for 1–3 months, and whether this could be a consistent offer to the UN. Further investigation would be required to establish what role high level staff would undertake, whether the need was constant, deployment lengths required, etc.

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[15] P2/P3/P4/P5 – Professional level staff grades within the UN system. P2 – Masters plus 2–3 years' experience, P3 – Masters plus 5 years' experience, P4 – Masters plus 7 years' experience, P5 – Masters plus 10 years' experience

Global Cluster Surge

Global Clusters have developed through partnerships between the UN and INGOs, but do not include NGOs who, if they do participate, do so at a national or sub-national level. UNICEF is supported in the Nutrition and WASH Clusters, and in the Child Protection area of responsibility (AoR) by Rapid Response Team and Field Support Teams. These are staffed by UNICEF and secondees from NGO partners, using Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) agreed as part of the Standby Partnership (SBP). UNFPA's RRT equivalent are the Roaming Emergency Gender Based Violence (GBV) Advisers (REGA) within the GBV AoR. The RRTs/REGAs increase global Cluster/AoR capacity through rapidly deployable Cluster coordination and information management personnel or through providing support to GBV sub-Cluster coordinators and members, HCTs and UN Country Teams (UNCT), national governments, civil society organisations (CSO), INGOs and NGOs.

RRT/FST or REGA members are either recruited by UNICEF, in the case of RRT/FSTs or through partner INGOs and they do not fulfil the traditional idea of surge, as staff are recruited full time through their respective partners and deploy when a request is made to the relevant UN agency or partner NGO. RRT members are based in Geneva, whilst REGAs are based in Cairo, Bangkok, Nairobi, Dakar and Geneva, supporting their respective regions with regional and national level emergency preparedness, planning, mentoring, advocacy, training and resource mobilisation. All REGAs are NRC secondees via SBP MOUs.

INGO participation within Global Clusters and Areas of Responsibility (AoR)

	Cluster / AoR	Current NGO Members	Profile	Deployment Duration	Hosting Org.	Funded by	Cluster/ field/ partner time % (1)
	Nutrition RRT	ACF WVI IMC Save (UK)	3 Cluster Coordinators 3 Information Management Officers	8 weeks with possible extension to 12 weeks	UNICEF	Grants to the Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC)	60% Deployment 20% Host partner 20% Cluster
	Nutrition Technical RRT	IMC US, Action Against Hunger US, Save the Children UK	1 Assessment 1 CMAM 1 IYCF-E 1 SBC/CMAM 1 IYCF-E/CMAM (2)	4–6 weeks, with possible extension to 8 weeks	Any Nutrition Partner	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)	50% Deployment 50% Cluster
	WASH FST	IMPACT Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) ACF Oxfam GB Solidarités International	4 Cluster Coordinators 3 Information Management Officers 1 Assessment Officer 1 Preparedness Officer 1 FST Team Manager	8 weeks with possible extension to 12 weeks	UNICEF	Standby Partners and Programme Cooperation Grants	60% Deployment 20% Host partner 20% Remote support to countries
	Education	FCA NRC (NORCAP) Save (Norway) Save (Denmark)	3 Cluster Coordinators 3 Information Management Officers	8 weeks with possible extension to 12 weeks	UNICEF or Save Offices	Save FCA NRC Save (Norway) Save (Denmark)	60% Deployment 20% Host partner 20% Cluster
	Shelter	IFRC NRC (NORCAP) REACH	2 Cluster Coordinators 2 Deputy Cluster Coordinators 2 Global Focal Points (GFP) (Coordination) 1 GFP (Assessment and M&E) 2 GFPs (Information Management) 2 Senior Roving Technical Coordinators 2 Support	38% time in field	UNHCR IFRC IOM	IFRC NRC REACH SDC UNHCR	29% Cluster 33% Remote support to countries 38% Deployment
	Protection	DRC NRC (CashCap)	Cluster Coordinator Project Manager 2 Field Support Officers Information Management Officer CashCap Comms & Strategy	Protection Officer 50% time in field

CashCap 90% of time in field | UNHCR | USAID | Project 100% Cluster Protection 50% Cluster 50% field Cash 10% Cluster 90% field |

	Cluster / AoR	Current NGO Members	Profile	Deployment Duration	Hosting Org.	Funded by	Cluster/ field/ partner time % (1)
	CCCM (3)	NRC (NORCAP)	2 Cluster Coordinators Senior Policy Officer Capacity Building Coordinator 3 Rapid Response Officers 2 Support Team Information Management Officer Associate CCCM Officer	Up to 1 month Rapid Response Officers 1–5 months	UNHCR IOM	Through Cluster Lead Agencies	Either Cluster or field – no time working with home organisation
	Food Security	Welthungerhilfe	**Global FS Cluster Coordinator Nutritionist Programme Officer Resource Mobilisation (VAM) Programme Officer (IPC) Agronomist** IMO Graphic designer (PT) GIS (PT) Urban crises and Cash transfers Reporting & Comms (JPO) Senior Admin Assistant	Only those in **bold** deploy (up to 1 month)	FAO / WFP	Finland Norway Germany	100% Cluster No maximum deployment time for core team
	Health	Save (as part of Health Cluster Support Programme – HCSP)	**1 GHC Coordinator 3 Technical Officers (P4)** 1 Technical Officer (P3) 1 Team Assistant Save – 3 Health Cluster Coordinators, 2 Information Management Officers	Those in **bold** deploy for up to 4 weeks 1 HCSP works for 4.5 months in Geneva. HCSPs deploy for up to 6 months	WHO	ECHO	60% Deployed 10% Cluster 30% Leave and R&R
	Logistics	ACF Spain	23 staff – various profiles	Maximum 6-9 months. 20% of staff will be deployed at any one time	WFP	50% WFP 50% Country operations	–
	Early Recovery	None	4 staff	N/A	UNDP	UNDP	N/A
	Emergency Telecomms (4)	NRC ChildFund Alliance Save (Sweden)	3 Cluster Coordinators 2 Information Management Officers	8 weeks with possible extension to 12 weeks	UNICEF	Standby Partners and 1 UNICEF	60% Deployment 40% AoR
	Early Recovery	None	4 staff	N/A	UNDP	UNDP	N/A
	GBV	NRC	5 REGA 1 REGA Manager GBV AoR Coordinator 2 GBV Focal Points	Permanent staff working regionally	UNFPA	GenCap OFDA NRC Swiss Development Corp (SDC)	50% Deployment 50% Cluster
	Housing, Land and Property	NRC	1 Coordinator 1 Chair @ 10%	Permanent staff working in NRC offices	N/A	NORCAP	100% Cluster
	Mine Action	None	AoR Coordinator 25% Programme Officer 66%	N/A	UNMAS	UNMAS	100% Cluster

(1) Headquarters versus field time percentages are a guideline
(2) Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition, Infant and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies, Social & Behavioural Change
(3) Unable to obtain information from IOM
(4) Unable to obtain information from the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster

Whilst reviews and evaluations of the RRT/FST/REGA mechanisms have shown them to be a valuable resource, both during and in–between deployments, funding to sustain the mechanisms is problematic. The funding these mechanisms received either is, ending or has come to an end, and so continuation of these mechanisms depends on ensuring predictable funding. Whilst donors such as DFID or the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) are content to develop new ideas through seed funding, it is generally assumed, that if successful, funding for these mechanisms will be found from the relevant UN agency's own resources.

● IFRC ● UNICEF ● NRC ● FCA ● REACH ● IOM

Global Shelter Cluster

The Global Shelter Cluster is a collaboration between UNHCR and IFRC, but also includes seconded support from 2 of UNHCR's standby partners, NORCAP and SDC, as well as from the NGO, REACH. As with the other global Cluster support mechanisms, Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) staff work together in support of country level and global Cluster initiatives between deployments to the field, which in the case of the GSC are usually no longer than 1 month in duration. Clusters at national level can also be led by IOM or be staffed through the SBP.

The GSC's Senior Roving Cluster Coordinators were supported in 2016 by NORCAP, whereby they were guaranteed to deploy for 6 months of the year. This mechanism worked well for the GSC, however staff felt that it was unsustainable, largely due to the contracting mechanism and mode of payment. Staff stated that their NORCAP contract meant they were perceived as not being full GSC staff, fee rates were lower, and Rest & Recuperation (R&R) cycles and benefits were more difficult to manage. Staff noted that they would prefer to be recruited on a UNHCR Temporary Appointment (TA) contract and the mechanism is now being reviewed.

In addition, the GSC now has 2 Senior Roving Technical Coordinators, supported by NORCAP and the Luxembourg Red Cross, whose remit it is to deploy for 6 months, work from home on GSC initiatives for 3 months and to have 3 months off.

- ⬤ SAVE THE CHILDREN ⬤ NRC ⬤ UNICEF ⬤ FCA

Global Education Cluster (GEC)

The Global Education Cluster was established in 2007, as a joint UNICEF and Save the Children initiative, the only Global Cluster to be co-led by an INGO. The GEC prepares for Cluster activation, management and deactivation, and ensures the GEC at a national level is staffed with appropriately trained staff, supported through a range of tools and guidance and supported remotely from the Global Education Cluster Unit, based in Geneva.

As well as staff within the GEC Unit, who are employed by either UNICEF or Save the Children, the GEC works with NGO partners to deliver against the annual workplan, which forms part of their overarching strategy. Participating INGOs includes FCA, NRC/NORCAP, Plan International, WVI and Save the Children. UN agencies also participate and discussion is currently underway to refresh the partnership and may eventually include IFRC and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as other INGOs. The refresh is largely due to challenges within this model, whereby partner organisations have struggled to find the resources internally to undertake the work to which they have been assigned. The refresh will also include financial and staffing commitments to the workplan, as well as accountability measures.

Global Clusters are already well established and are working with a range of partners, as was originally envisaged. Staff from organisations involved with Clusters are able to influence performance, through downtime preparedness, and emergency deployment. However very few of the Clusters are fully funded by their lead organisation, and support is reliant on gratis secondee staff or grants from donors, which increases uncertainty and unpredictability. The look and dynamic of a Global Cluster changes as INGO staff are replaced by staff from other INGOs or UN agency and / or new INGOs become part of the Cluster. Staff pay, terms and conditions differ according to employer, which makes management challenging, and at times, staff from INGOs have been unhappy with the arrangement, citing higher pay and benefits of UN employees as the main reason. Only the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) manages to remain financially sustainable, whereby WFP funds 50% of staff and the remainder are paid for from the field operations into which they deploy. The GLC has historically been less cross organisational, with only limited participation from INGOs. There is currently only 1 secondee (from ACF, Spain) within the GLC, however, unlike other Clusters, this secondee is paid for by the GLC and not by the seconding organisation.

Organisations who wish to become part of a Global Cluster, should be cognisant of the level of support required to ensure sustainability, in both financial and human resource terms. Many Global Clusters find shared resources, where time is shared between time with the Cluster, deployment for the Cluster and for the seconding organisation difficult to manage downtime workload and to make progress against Cluster workplans, in between deployments and work with their home organisation.

Team Mechanisms

International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)

INSARAG was established in 1991 after international urban search and rescue (USAR) teams collaborated during the 1985 Mexican and 1988 Armenian earthquake responses. To fit within existing coordination structures, INSARAG was created with a secretariat within OCHA's Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS). INSARAG comprises over 80 countries and organisations, establishing minimum standards and international earthquake response methodology.

There are 95 teams listed currently on the USAR Directory[16], of which 75% are government teams, mostly drawn from existing national USAR capability, 23% are Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) teams and 2% are composed of volunteers. NGOs who wish to undergo INSARAG classification are specialist search and rescue organisations, which are endorsed by their country's national focal point for INSARAG membership.

The UN does not undertake search and rescue activities and so it cannot be said that INSARAG supports the UN in achieving its aim, but it does assist the UN and Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) through easing coordination challenges in the first stages of a response. INSARAG teams are supported at present through UNDAC and the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC), which in turn are supported by specialist mapping and assessment INGOs, amongst others. Due to the specialist nature of USAR, there is very little, if any way that INGOs could add value or where the work of INSARAG could add value to INGOs.

The INSARAG network is a tight knit network of USAR practitioners, with broadly one aim, to ensure a coordinated, standardised response. The politics of deployments are managed at ministry level, who set their agenda for responding, leaving the practitioners on the ground to save lives. Whilst there is competition to be first in the queue to be assigned the best work site, teams collaborate on the ground, largely due to the tight knit community formed outside of a response. In addition, funding is not linked to outputs or outcomes as it would be within INGOs; teams are driven purely on the desire to rescue live people from buildings, or help return bodies of victims to their family. It is recognised that USAR's value is symbolic and political, as opposed to life-saving interventions offering good value for money[17].

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC)

UNDAC was created in 1993 to assist governments in the first phase of a response, including coordination, assessment and information management. UNDAC Teams are managed and coordinated through FCSS, providing regionally based expertise. There have been 31 UNDAC disaster preparedness missions since 1993, and 237 emergency missions, 76 of which were for floods, 55 for tropical cyclones, 48 for earthquakes / tsunamis and 23 for complex emergencies[18] . Terms of Reference are often, but not always, agreed with the Resident Coordinator (RC) / Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and OCHA prior to deployment. UNDAC teams vary in size[19], depending on the scale of the emergency and can be deployed for up to 28 days[20]. At times UNDAC teams have been required for longer, and team rotations have been put in place, for example the Pakistan floods in 2010[21]. UNDAC acts as the interface between disaster management and humanitarian coordination, for example, coordinating search and rescue activities, as well as facilitating needs assessments.

UNDAC Teams are comprised of personnel made available by over 80 governments, the UN, international and regional organisations, deployed within 12-48 hours worldwide at the request of the RC, HC and/or the affected government. UNDAC could be considered an interagency mechanism where staff from disparate organisations, with different backgrounds and skillsets deploy alongside each other. Doing this requires investment on both the part of FCSS and UNDAC members, with induction and ongoing refresher training, and remaining familiar with the UNDAC methodology. Despite a methodology being in place, UNDAC teams don't always work well together, with team leadership and interpersonal relationships being cited as reasons for sub-optimal performance.

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[16] https://vosocc.unocha.org/USAR_Directory/USARTeamsByregion.asp

[17] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67579/HERR.pdf

[18] The remaining 35, were for drought, forest fires, technological / environmental, volcanic eruption and "other"

[19] Average team size in 2016 was 7

[20] Average deployment duration in 2016 was 16 days

[21] https://vosocc.unocha.org/VOUNDAC.aspx#_top%23_top%23_top

Both nomination and deselection of UNDAC members is highly political; at times those nominated by Member States do not meet profiles or competencies required. Prospective UNDAC Members are nominated by member states to participate in 2-week induction courses which are held regionally. This selection process, leads to many applicants being drawn from the civil protection community, not the humanitarian community and where many INGOs are unaware of the process of nomination for inclusion as an UNDAC member. As a result, there are very few, trained UNDAC members drawn from the INGO community.

UNDAC could not operate without its partners, either the member states who finance UNDAC deployees, or a number of partnerships which have been developed over the years to provide niche skillsets to an otherwise generalist civil protection and humanitarian UNDAC team.

UNDAC Partners[22]

Organisation	Service	Service
MapAction	Mapping	NGO
ACAPs	Assessment and analysis experts	NGO
Télécoms Sans Frontière (TSF)	Telecoms assessments and IT support	NGO
Fuel Relief Fund	Accessing fuel for the humanitarian community	NGO
International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP)	Base camps, OSOCC, ICT modules and staff	Governmental
Americas Support Team (AST)	ICT, logistics, field assessments, and information management	Governmental
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)	Training	UN
UNITAR's Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT)	Satellite imagery and geographic information	UN
DHL	Airport handling and logistics services	Private Sector

Like all surge mechanisms, there are strengths and weaknesses to how UNDAC operates. UNDAC is an extremely collaborative mechanism, with member states supporting UNDAC members, collaboration with other assessment and coordination teams, such as the EU Civil Protection Team and partners such as MapAction and ACAPs providing niche support. The UNDAC methodology, forms an integral part of UNDAC members' induction and refresher training, and seeks to ensure that UNDAC members, who rarely deploy together are able to work more effectively, although non-anecdotal evidence to support that assertion is limited, if not absent.

The challenges with UNDAC largely concern the membership, where Global South members lack the funding to deploy, selection and deselection of UNDAC members is highly political and availability of UNDAC members is low. One of the key aspects missing from UNDAC missions is the presence of humanitarian expertise; where only 25% of UNDAC's members could be considered as possessing humanitarian, as opposed to disaster management expertise.

The absence of Humanitarian expertise in UNDAC teams could be a potential opportunity for INGO engagement, especially as UNDAC deployment durations mean that responding organisations' resources are not required for long periods of time. There are 2 possible models for engagement;

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[22] 2 other partners, EMERCOM and Cascos Blancos have not participated recently.
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/UNDAC_MSP_brochure.pdf

- INGO staff become UNDAC members, supported from internal funds or through their relevant member state

- INGOs discuss a collaborative arrangement with FCSS, whereby INGOs provide 1–2 staff per mission as a bolt on service to an UNDAC Team.

In both scenarios, INGO deployees could assist in needs assessments and drafting flash appeals, help establish Clusters, or dock into existing sectoral mechanisms and encourage greater local NGO participation. As well as providing a humanitarian viewpoint within the UNDAC mechanism, benefits of such participation could include early engagement with the UN system for both INGOs and NGOs, as well as access to funding. Participation would facilitate a greater understanding of the UN system and vice versa, which deployees would take back to their home organisation.

Emergency Medical Team (EMT)

The EMT Initiative mission is to reduce the loss of lives and prevent disability in sudden-onset disasters and outbreaks through rapid deployment and coordination of quality-assured EMTs. It is coordinated via the EMT Unit, based in WHO, Geneva.

Examples of international EMTs include the Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AusMat) where staff are drawn from the Australian Health Service, funded by Australia's Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Like AUSMAT, UK EMT staff are drawn from the National Health Service, but they are coordinated through an NGO, UK-Med, which trains roster members to respond to trauma, medical and public health emergencies. The UK EMT is fully funded by DFID, and logistical support is drawn from the UK International Search and Rescue Team (UKISAR), who have the requisite skills due to their experience of managing USAR deployments, including customs, immigration, aircraft unloading, transportation and site selection and infrastructure.

The EMT initiative is also developing partnerships with disaster response actors, including the IFRC where national members will participate in the mentorship and peer review process. They also have strong operational relationships with OCHA and ICRC as well as regional organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). There is strong focus on development of national teams, who can arrive faster and be linguistically and culturally appropriate. The concept is national first, regional second and international as a last resort when needs are overwhelming. This national and regional focus of the EMT initiative is its key strength.

Save the Children has an Emergency Health Unit and the IFRC has Emergency Response Units (ERU) in Basic Health Care, a Referral Hospital and a Rapid Deployment Hospital. Establishing a medical capability is extremely specialist and costly. Unless INGOs have health modules for deployment, there would be little value in engaging with the EMT Initiative. INGOs who wish to engage further on health issues are better suited to engaging with the Global Health Cluster. In addition, the EMT initiative prioritises national over international responders and this would further signal that collaboration in EMTs would not be recommended.

Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)

GOARN, coordinated by WHO is a collaboration of human and technical resources from institutions and networks, ready to respond to undertake rapid identification, confirmation and response to outbreaks of international importance. There are over 600 partners, which include public health authorities such as Public Health England (PHE), laboratories, academic institutions, government ministries, hospitals, centres for disease control and INGOs such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children International and Medicines Sans Frontière (MSF). GOARN was established in 2000, and is guided by a Steering Committee of network partners. Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and Response and operational protocols to standardise epidemiological, laboratory, clinical management, research, communications, logistics support, security, evacuation and communications systems have been developed. Since 2000, GOARN has responded to over 50 emergencies globally, with 400 experts deployed in 40 countries.

Team Mechanisms have developed around specialised needs in a response and they continue to be created in accordance with need. For example, there was no EMT initiative prior to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, INSARAG was created to ensure standards in international response, and UNDAC was created to coordinate incoming USAR teams. Each of these mechanisms has learnt from the others that developed previously, and have shared best practice.

Some INGOs are part of the GOARN network, but there is little, if any engagement from INGOs in other team mechanisms due to their niche focus. There is no visible gap where generalist humanitarian INGOs or IOs could add value in team mechanisms apart from within UNDAC teams, where humanitarian expertise is greatly needed and where deployment durations are short, and not so draining on INGO or IO resources.

WFP / UNICEF Rapid Response Mechanism

In 2014, UNICEF and WFP created the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) to reach inaccessible areas in South Sudan, through the deployment of UNICEF and WFP staff to deep field locations, and working with local and international organisations. This was set up primarily to reach a large amount of conflict-affected people in a multi-disciplinary approach with food distributions, child vaccinations, access to water, support access to education, conduct registrations and to undertake screening. As of September 2015, UNICEF and WFP had undertaken 55 RRM missions in South Sudan. The decision to work together was cost driven, ensuring value for money in joint deployments to remote locations. The RRM has since been replicated in Iraq, supported by OCHA, UNFPA, IOM and 9 implementing partners, including Save the Children.

Hybrid Models

Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS)

The concept of ACAPS was developed from the Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA), undertaken soon after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in 2008. It was established in 2009 as a 2-year project, at a time when there was no coordinated multi-sector assessment methodology accepted by the humanitarian community, nor experts to undertake assessments. Later ACAPS identified a lack of independent analytical capacity within the humanitarian system and began focusing in that area also. ACAPS can work embedded with UN operations, such as with an UNDAC mission or work separately. ACAPS is a non-profit project of a consortium of three NGOs, Action ACF, NRC and Save the Children. Deployment to the field is based on analysis at headquarters, indicating that a situation is escalating sufficiently to warrant field analysis.

In addition to deployment on its own account, ACAPS has a roster of approximately 60 people across 3 profiles,[23] who can be deployed upon request. Expertise from the roster can be deployed on a cost recovery basis, funded from ACAPS core budget or paid for through project specific funding, such as the Syria Needs Assessment Project (SNAP). Requests are considered against criteria, which include whether it contributes to longer term capacity, and benefits the wider humanitarian system, but ACAPS is also able to be flexible as to what deployments they support.

In addition to the roster, ACAPS benefits from 4 full time staff, whose remit it is to deploy when required, but to work from home in between deployments, a model very similar to that of the RRTs / REGAs, etc. As with other surge mechanisms, filling shorter posts with senior staff is easier than for longer roles, but in general ACAPS does not struggle to fill rapid-onset roles. One benefit of the ACAPS model is that it grows its own talent, through its 12-month traineeship programme, which can lead to permanent positions with ACAPS. The combination of the 3 models works well for ACAPS, enabling them to respond effectively.

MapAction

MapAction deploys primarily through UNDAC, to provide mapping services in the first phase of an emergency. These deployments are underpinned by an MOU, which is the same as for standby partners. Unlike standard SBP MOUs, the MapAction – OCHA MOU contains a clause which states that MapAction will not undertake 3 month deployments, which is the usual minimum for secondments. In general, the team stays for 2 weeks, but can stay on depending on availability of staff and funding. All MapAction staff are volunteers, who are either released by their jobs, take leave or unpaid leave to deploy. At times, MapAction has received funding from DFID to remain in country after the first 2 weeks. MapAction receives no funding from OCHA for the services it provides to UNDAC, where a 2-week mission of 2 people costs £18,000[24]

There are currently 3 other NGOs within the same sphere who support the UN, each of which provides slightly different services and with which MapAction collaborates.

• **CartONG** – mobile data collection, mapping and GIS, capacity building and information management

• **iMMAP** – data collection, data analysis, database management, infographics and mapping, tools developing, training and mentoring, information management (IM) change management and IM consultation and strategy

• **REACH** – joint initiative of IMPACT, ACTED and UNOSAT. It undertakes interagency assessments, remote sensing, secondary data reviews, reports, maps, web-maps and online dashboards and supports UNDAC in data collection. It is involved in the Shelter, CCCM, WASH, Early Recovery, Food Security, Protection and Education Cluster.

In addition, the Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN) is a network of organisations that provide information-based services to the humanitarian community. ACAPS, MapAction, CartONG and iMMAP are all members of the DHN.

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[23] Senior Analyst, Analyst and Assessment Expert

[24] Including flights, subsistence, accommodation, security and first aid training, country and annual insurance, equipment, passports, vaccinations and overheads.

MapAction has worked together with ACAPs, supplying maps for briefing papers and now does this together with CartONG, taking turns to provide up to 20 maps per year to ACAPs. MapAction also worked with ACAPs on the Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP).

MapAction, together with iMMAP and CartONG have a Field Level Agreement (FLA) with UNICEF for West Africa, where, in theory each organisation takes turns to deploy teams on a cost recovery basis. This arrangement is challenging for MapAction due to the volunteer dimension, as requests in this context are slow moving and many volunteers are only able to be released by their employer for rapid-onset emergencies. MapAction also has an FLA with WFP for preparedness services, again on a cost recovery basis in Asia Pacific, which works well for MapAction. A further agreement with UNDP in Vanuatu was discussed, but administrating the contract was problematic, and the window for support with the Vanuatu authorities had passed.

MapAction's strengths lie in the quality of its service to the humanitarian community. They bring a skillset which is prized by the humanitarian community, and work well with other organisations within the same sphere, complementing the work of ACAPS, iMMAP, REACH and CartONG. The one weakness that MapAction identified was that the short durations of emergencies did not at times meet the needs of the humanitarian community. They sought to address this within the following case study.

Case Study - MapAction

MapAction's model has been key to MapAction's success in the immediate aftermath of an emergency, supporting UN, governments and NGO operations for up to 6 weeks, through 2 week rotations of volunteer staff, a service which helps MapAction meet strategic aim 1, of their 2014-2019 strategy.

As part of the strategy, and in response to client requests for a longer presence in the field, MapAction reviewed the relatively short time frames of MapAction deployments and concluded that at times, deployment durations did not match the longer-term needs of the humanitarian community. MapAction often faced challenges in identification of organisations to hand over their products, or to provide training to those who would continue providing the service and were often asked to continue their services after the 6-week period. Chronic or slow-onset crises also pointed to the need for longer-term support, and MapAction felt there was a gap to be filled and the concept of the Transition Team (TT) was born.

Considerations included;
- The need to sustain outputs into the recovery phase of a response
- Ensuring specialist support to incoming Information Management (IM) or Geographic Information Systems (GIS) teams
- Response continuity resulting in better relationships with, and a greater understanding of agencies' requirements
- Predictability of mid-term capacity

MapAction investigated various models of how to secure availability of staff to fill this role and settled on an amended version of DFID's Retainer Programme (RP), which pays RP members a small daily stipend to be on standby for deployment for a minimum of 21 days and when deployed, members are paid a standard deployment rate. The TT deploys for 1 month, which could be extended if funding allows. The TT is deployed on a cost recovery basis and so require response specific funding.

The TT is a team within a team, comprised of MapAction's carefully selected volunteers. MapAction recognised that it was vitally important that the TT did not undermine MapAction's core standby capacity. In the first year this has been in place, MapAction has found that it is the self-employed members who have participated the most in the TT, but that they have found it difficult to balance TT deployments with their other work. Many MapAction volunteers would be interested in participating within the TT, but employment obligations make that more difficult.

MapAction has been fast to act on lessons identified within the first year of operation. For example, MapAction has amended the original model, so that TT members remain motivated whilst on standby. This includes utilising their skills for 2 days to work on internal activities, ensuring a benefit to MapAction in general. In addition, marketing the TT has been a challenge, where organisations do not yet know that this capacity exists. An annual review of the TT will also aid MapAction to adjust to the needs of the humanitarian sector.

MapAction Strategy 2014-19 http://maps.mapaction.org/dataset/203-3649/resource/f142d572-73d1-416e-9ade-ae89d421a727

The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPs)

JIPS is an interagency initiative, established in 2009, as a joint initiative between UNHCR and DRC governed via Executive Committee and Strategic Advisory Board,[25] to support government, humanitarian and development actors with IDP profiling. It is based in Geneva and provides 4 core services: field support for IDP profiling, context specific training, provision of tools and guidance and advocacy. IFRC and OCHA developed guidance on IDP profiling in 2007/8, which JIPS then operationalised, implementing recommendations.

JIPS works with ACAPS on field missions, with the Global Protection Cluster at both global and field level, with the Profiling and Assessment Resource Kit (PARK), the CCCM Cluster and with CartONG who support JIPS with mobile data collection[26]. Requests for JIPS support are reviewed biannually by the Executive Committee, which consists of DRC, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), NRC, OCHA, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights of IDPs, UNDP and UNHCR.

JIPS operates similar to RRT/FSTs/REGAs, in that staff are employed full time, on a DRC contract at different levels (Coordinator, Managers, Advisers, Officers and Associates) within Field Support, Information Management, Training and Capacity Building and Communications and Advocacy units. Profiling Coordinators are deployed for short periods and can be supported by consultants who have undertaken the Profiling Coordination training. Consultants can be either branded UNHCR or DRC.

JIPS services are currently funded by DRC, NRC, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNHCR, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA), the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. State Department (BPRM) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). In addition, UN Habitat and UNHCR can provide project based funding for non-interagency requests by individual organisations, or on a cost sharing basis.

It is this full-time nature of JIPs, like with RRTs/FRSTs/REGAs that are its strength; people work together in "peacetime" so that response in stronger. Knowledge captured in the field is brought back to others within JIPS.

The relatively new hybrid models have made their mark in the world of surge; there are few who haven't heard of ACAPS, JIPs or MapAction, and their reputation as expert and reliable service providers. Their business model is not to fill every gap, but to provide an outstanding service in the small field in which they operate. Start Network INGOs, by contrast, are already relatively big, offer a range of services and are likely to benefit from the hybrid model's services, rather than compete with, or complement these organisations through the creation of such a niche model.

[25] Executive Committee comprising of DRC, IDMC, NRC, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR and the Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights of IDPs.

[26] Also, the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, Statistics Norway, the Office of the Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights of IDPs and Data 2X.

Thematic Mechanisms

ProCap/GenCap

ProCap and GenCap were established as collaborative, interagency mechanisms to respond to senior level (P4/P5) gaps within protection and gender emergency responses. Agencies receiving ProCap or GenCap personnel are expected to contribute to the Humanitarian Country Team's response. ProCap Officers are on permanent rotation and can deploy to work with the HC, UNHCR, UNICEF, OHCHR, OCHA, or other agencies with a protection mandate. GenCap Advisers can work with the HC or UN agencies. Both mechanisms are overseen by a Steering Committee (SC) that guides direction, undertakes recruitment, makes decisions on deployments and provides oversight. OCHA's Surge Capacity Section hosts both the ProCap and GenCap support units, to ensure they are interagency, as well as to ensure ProCap Officers and GenCap Advisers are able to access discussions on humanitarian policy and coordination. NRC employs all ProCap and GenCap staff, sits on GenCap's Steering Committee[27] and is an Observer on the ProCap Steering Committee[28]. There has been some concern that the Steering Committees for both mechanisms are too heavy. Both mechanisms also seek to facilitate information exchange, uphold common standards and build capacity through training. ProCap works with Austcare, CANADEM, DRC, NRC, RedR Australia, and Save the Children Sweden, Denmark and Norway to participate within its training programme.

ProCap and GenCap were established in 2005 and 2007 respectively, and their longevity is evidence of their success. However, they weren't established with an infinite lifespan, but the humanitarian sphere has changed meaning there is still a need. The interagency nature of these mechanisms, and their Steering Committees results in a holistic response to an emergency, rather than one which is driven by the needs of one agency. Funding, is again reliant on donor support as a project, rather than it being centralised within core funding of any particular agency. Each mechanism undergoes an independent review every 5 years.

Whilst all ProCap or GenCap Advisers are on NRC contracts, there could be an opportunity for INGO engagement where they have capacity in either of these skillsets, through training or deployments, however the latter would require a change to both models, and human resources to support the initiative.

Theme	Requests	Duration	Number of Members	Grade	Funding
ProCap	**Biennial call for requests, submitted to OCHA and approved by Steering Committee. Ad hoc requests also considered for L3 emergencies**	6 – 12 months	21	P4/P5	Via OCHA appeal
GenCap			30		
CashCap	Requests are graded and either endorsed or not endorsed by the CashCap Response Unit	3 – 6 months	27	P4/P5 Some at P3	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently looking for other funding
CDAC	Through standard SBP channels and through CDAC Network	3+ months	55	P2–P5	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
CCCMCap	Through standard SBP channels and country operations	3+ months	110	P2–P5	From 10 donors between 2012 and 2016
ACAPs	Through the ACAPS website and through networks	Any duration	60	N/A	Core funding from donors Project specific funding Cost Recovery
NORCAP	Through standard SBP channels	6–18 months	780	P3/P4, occasionally at P2 or P5	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs DFID The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) European Union (EU) Some are cost shared or fully funded by the receiving UN agency

[27] OCHA, FAO, UNHCR, UNFPA, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UN Women and NRC. The Gender Research Group has observer status.

[28] OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA and International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). NRC and the Global Protection Cluster (GPC) have observer status.

Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) Network

The CDAC Network comprises more than 30 organisations, dedicated to making aid more effective through information exchange, communication and community engagement. They enable communities to have a voice in emergencies, to improve transparency, trust and accountability, ultimately resulting in better outcomes. As a relatively new concept, the CDAC network aims to build the evidence base for community engagement, develop tools and guidance to facilitate training and learning.

The CDAC Network Board includes both NGOs and UN agencies, and consists of an independent Chair, an independent Honorary Treasurer, BBC Media Action, Internews Europe, IOM, Plan International, OCHA and WVI.

The CDAC Network maintains a roster of skilled deployable experts, managed by the NRC's expert deployment roster, NORCAP.[29] These experts can be deployed at the request of a Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), a humanitarian organisation or national disaster management authority (NDMA). Funding for NORCAP is through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). Whilst the majority of CDAC profile positions are filled via NORCAP, roles have also, at times been filled by other standby partners.

CDAC's partnership with NORCAP, is a strength, enabling CDAC to deploy experts from the roster and mobilise capacity required in support of Network members' humanitarian responses. This is complemented by their approach to building capacity, the roster complements their research, learning, training, innovation and advocacy to influence policy and practice.

As with other surge mechanisms, rosters need to be maintained, funding needs to be secured, availability of members is challenging and members need to be kept up to date with changes in the sector, through new initiatives and evolving contexts. Duty of care and safety and security for deployees has been raised once as an issue where deploying into a national organisation, and this could also be problematic when deploying into other organisations in the future. In addition, as with other mechanisms, it is difficult to evidence results of deployments within agencies or responses. Feedback is positive, but without quantitative or qualitative evidence, it is not enough to attract funding.

At present, the CDAC network does not directly support the UN during emergencies. Individual organisations are assisted by secondees[30] in their response, however further support to the UN could be envisaged in terms of supporting wider CDAC coordination, ensuring that lessons from previous emergencies, best practice, signposting to tools and guidelines are all in place.

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[29] Full list of aims: http://www.cdacnetwork.org/about-the-network/who-we-are/

[30] Term used specifically for staff surged from one organisation to another.

Case Study – The Cash and Markets Capacity Building Roster (CashCap)

NRC is well known for its ability to manage rosters and for the deployment of experts into humanitarian operations worldwide. NRC is also renowned for being amongst the first to identify gaps in human resource expertise within the humanitarian system and to take steps to close the gap. NRC was at the forefront of the SBP in 1991, with the creation of NORCAP and has gone on to develop other initiatives in support of the humanitarian community, including ProCap and GenCap.

In 2014, NRC identified a lack of skills and capacity to mainstream cash transfer programming (CTP) within the humanitarian community, and looked to long established ProCap and GenCap as a model. NRC was able to learn from the process of establishing both ProCap and GenCap and from years of roster management.

Development Phase

NRC developed a concept note and approached ECHO for funding. Upon learning about CashCap, DFID was interested in funding the capacity building element, not just for CashCap roster members, but for others within the SBP, suitable for entry into CTP deployments. The first 2 years of CashCap, including establishing the roster and deployments were 60% funded by ECHO and 40% by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with DFID funding the additional capacity building element, which was managed by NRC and the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP). Developing CashCap was a collaborative effort between NRC and CaLP, where Standby Partners' candidates were also able to capitalise on the learning opportunities available through CashCap.

Implementation Phase

The initial 6 recruitment rounds took place in late 2015, early 2016, with that model now being revised to rolling recruitment. There are currently 27 CashCap members, who are mentored by a Roving CashCap Adviser. CashCap roster members can be deployed in support of UN agencies, integrated missions, national authorities and INGOs, at a global or country level. A critical focus on a CashCap deployment is that it has to benefit a response, as opposed to an individual organisation. The roster comprises senior Technical or Strategic Coordination experts, and requests are considered by a 3-person Steering Committee, against strict criteria, within 24 hours for emergency missions and within 14 days for preparedness missions. Deployments are generally 3-6 months long, and at P4/P5 level.

The first deployments began in January 2016, where CashCap members were deployed in support of the Global Food Security Cluster in Nigeria. These deployees helped strengthen CTP capacity in the food security sector, in close cooperation with the Cash Working Group (CWG).

Successes and Challenges

Demand is good for CashCap experts, and at times, supply cannot meet demand. Feedback from users of CashCap deployees is also good. However, like many other surge mechanisms, requesting agencies want to retain the resource in country, tying up a valuable and free (to them) resource. In addition, finding sustainable funding past the seed funding stage has also been problematic.

Hopes for the Future

- To increase the roster to 40-60 candidates
- To implement twinning opportunities for senior members
- That CashCap members undertake Training of Trainers to become certified CaLP trainers
- Training people in cash logistics
- Implement more capacity building of CashCap members
- Enable CTP technical practitioners to gain experience in strategic coordination
- Securing more predictable funding to enable CashCap to grow

Supporting UNHCR Resources on the Ground with Experts on mission (SURGE)

SURGE was established in 2001 as a framework between UNHCR and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to create a roster of highly qualified junior-level protection professionals for deployment to UNHCR field offices, to meet short to medium-term protection needs in non-emergency settings. At that time, SURGE was funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM) within the U.S. Department of State. It is currently funded by UNHCR's Division of International Protection (DIP).

Secondees' roles include voluntary repatriation, returnee monitoring, local integration, physical security of refugees, arrest and detention, border monitoring, registration, refugee women, refugee children, the prevention of sexual and gender based violence, statelessness, Cluster coordination and internally displaced persons. SURGE staff are deployed via a nil/nil consultancy contract with UNHCR, which affords them "Expert on Mission" status. Deployment lengths vary, up to a maximum of 11 months. Between them, SURGE secondees are deployed for between 150 to 200 deployment months within a given year.

Candidates undergo a lengthy vetting process, being vetted on the qualification and strict criteria followed. Assessment includes a written test, interview and reference check. There are over 75 nationalities represented, including a good distribution among regions. Both the roster and deployments are gender balanced, where just over 50% of roster members are women.

Unlike ProCap and GenCap, and many of the other mechanisms detailed here, SURGE is now wholly funded by UNHCR. It is the single agency element of SURGE that makes this funding more predictable when compared with interagency mechanisms.

Opportunities for INGO – UN Collaboration

Alignment between INGOs and UN agencies in surge can occur on a generalist level, such as the SBP, with the provision of a range of expertise, or on a specialist level, through the provision of expertise around a niche skillset, such as nutrition expertise within the Global Nutrition Cluster or cash expertise through CashCap. There are already INGOs operating in the surge field, especially within the SBP, who are well placed to maintain generalist databases and develop others on a specialist theme. However, there are still areas where generalist and cross cutting skillsets could be required, such as in support to UNDAC.

In the context of surge, collaboration between INGOs and the UN is generally one way, with INGOs seconding staff to work in UN agencies. This research found no evidence of UN staff being surged into INGOs, nor did respondents raise this as an option. Benefits gained from INGOs and UN staff working together, such as cross-fertilisation of ideas and a greater understanding of each other's operations, were obtained when staff were seconded from INGOs into UN operations, and not vice versa. UN agencies are quick to capitalise on INGOs' practice, identification and understanding of "new" areas, such as Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) or cash transfer programming, where INGOs invest in building capacity to respond, only for subsequent UN involvement to slow down further development, and / or "poach" INGO staff. Respondents generally felt that the UN was behind the curve in regard to specialist expertise that INGOs need, and so surging from the UN into INGOs was unnecessary.

The best outcomes from UN and INGO collaboration seem to be achieved with long-term secondees, whose remit it is to deploy in emergencies. To all intents and purposes, this makes this standing capacity as opposed to surge capacity, albeit not funded on an employer to employee basis in the traditional way. Where INGOs at times struggle to meet their own response needs, financing staff to work full time within a Global Cluster would be challenging, and short-term deployments would be more practicable.

The table below includes ideas on ways to collaborate, together with an estimate on the level of investment required for implementation, which will not only include the financial or human resources required, but also an assessment on senior level engagement required for discussions. For each mechanism, there is an assumed benefit to both entities.

	Mechanism	Concept	Level of Investment (establishment / HR / funding)
1	UNDAC	INGO members are UNDAC trained (and are possibly rostered across INGOs)	Low / Low / Low
2	UNDAC	INGOs develop a humanitarian module to deploy alongside UNDAC	Low / Low / Low
3	RRT/FST/REGA	INGOs second staff long-term to work in thematic RRT/FST/REGAs	Low / High / High
4	RRT	INGOs work with UN agencies to develop an RRT within a sector not yet represented	Medium / High / High
5	Co-led Cluster	To work with the current Cluster-lead within a chosen Cluster to work collaboratively following the example of the Global Education Cluster	Medium / High / High
6	Sub-national Cluster	Where the INGO has a presence in country, lead the Cluster at a sub-national level	Medium / High / High
7	HCT	As operational planners in support of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), enabling the response	High / Medium / Medium
8	RC/HC	As (Deputy) Humanitarian Coordinators in the first 1-3 months of an emergency, working alongside an RC, leading the HCT	High / Medium / Medium
9	Standing capacity utilisation	Using organisations' redundant standing capacity on a cost recovery basis with other organisations	Medium / High / Low
10	Standby Partnership	Using organisations' redundant standing capacity via the SBP to be funded by the relevant donor	Medium / High / Low
11	Associate Surge Pool	Using organisations' redundant standing capacity via the SBP to be funded by OCHA	Low / High / Low
12	National and Regional Preparedness	INGOs work with UN agencies, National Disaster Management Authorities, donors and regional organisations to establish surge requirements within emergencies in accordance with countries' own capacity to respond to emergencies of different scales	High / Medium / Medium

It should be noted that this table includes examples drawn from within this research, different models could be developed which are still considered surge, but do not resemble any listed here.

Best Practice

Linked to INGO and UN collaboration, there are examples of best practice which could be further explored. These include;

- The SBPs' Training Secretariat, a common service, providing guidance and capacity building support to standby partners and UN receiving agencies.[31]

- The SBP's Support Coordinator, a common service, enabling the SBP to address areas of common concern and undertake administration on behalf of the SBP

- UNDAC's methodology, so that disparate UNDAC members can operate together effectively.

- GOARN's, EMT's and INSARAG's standardisation of services provided, to ensure interoperability between teams.

Respondents pointed to the need for a shared platform to discuss surge, challenges, issues, best practice, etc., highlighting that not everybody is aware of The Transforming Surge Capacity Project / CHS Alliance Surge Capacity Online Platform. Those that did, felt that this could be more successful if it was mixed with a level of face to face engagement. The CHS Alliance's Humanitarian HR conference touches the surface of discussion and collaboration which could occur, before humanitarian surge practitioners return to their own organisations. Agencies are working in silos to address the challenges of surge capacity and respondents felt that a face to face community of practice would be good complement to the online resource available.

UN respondents felt that INGOs could be more effective using a consortia approach, whereby UN agencies have 1 interlocutor responsible for representing a range of consortium members. For any organisation, managing multiple partnerships and relationships is resource intensive, but managing consortia is also time consuming for those within the consortium. INGOs presenting as one to the UN through a coordinating body, simply switches the responsibility for coordination away from UN agencies, to resource scarce INGOs.

The principle of consortia would apply in this context. Individual Start Network agencies have different mandates, as well as levels of resources through which it could support UN operations, and, only a sub-set of Start Network agencies form part of the TSCP. The TSCP would have to consider whether any "offer" to collaborate with the UN on surge is as the Start Network, the TSCP or as individual Start Network agencies, and look at the implications of each, including management, representation, authority, coordination , etc., as well as on a more practical level, around recruitment processes, staff quality, training and standing operating procedures. Coming together may be more effective, but the outcome must be worth the input required, both financially and in human resource terms.

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[31] List of other activities found in Annex 2

Phase 1 Recommendations

Collaboration works more effectively when there are resources dedicated to meet aims. Often, organisations have the best intention to collaborate, but financial and human resources aren't set aside to make it happen.

- As the Transforming Surge Capacity Project is coming to an end, TSCP organisations should urgently identify resources through which to take forward any of the recommendations proposed, and accepted in this research.

The TSCP members could add value in the majority of the surge mechanisms detailed, but many require long-term input which would be beyond the reach of most TSCP organisations. In addition, some of the initiatives are already well established and staffed, and so opportunities for input were less. Two mechanisms stood out as having already been discussed, and where the UN had already expressed an interested in collaborating. Upon discussion with members of the international platform and international Steering Committee of the TSCP, the following recommendations were made;

- To investigate further collaboration, either within UNDAC as full UNDAC members or as a bolt-on service provider to the UNDAC system; and

- To investigate support to sub-national Clusters

These recommendations will be explored more throughly in phase 2 of this study, with a particular focus on local staff support to both mechanisms. Support to sub-national Clusters will be investigated in the Pakistan and the Philippines contexts where mechanisms for sharing staff have already been established.

In addition, a third area was identified, where the gain from collaboration was perceived to be substantial;

- Investigate the need for INGO leadership collaboration, taking into account existing mechanisms' Terms of Reference and support available to UN humanitarian response leadership. Any support would need to embed with UN led leadership, the RC/HC/HCT and the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM).

Whilst this paper concerns UN and INGO collaboration, one of the key areas which arose, was that of representation and presentation.

- Before proceeding with discussions, the TSCP should clarify whether any "offer" to collaborate with the UN on surge is as the Start Network, the TSCP or as individual Start Network agencies, and look at the implications of each, including representation, authority, coordination, etc., as well as on a more practical level, around recruitment processes, staff quality, training and standing operating procedures.

In addition to the areas of investigation which will be taken forward, TSCP organisations could collaborate with the UN through;

- Seconding staff into a Cluster or Area of Responsibility (AoR), either within a Rapid Response Team (RRT) on a long-term basis or for short-term input, similar to input via the Standby Partnership (SBP);

- Encouraging greater participation, including national NGOs, within the TRIPLEX simulation;

- Forming part of OCHA's emergency preparedness planning in the Asia region. There is an opportunity to ensure predictable support to emergencies through this process, through integrated resource planning, based on modelling of future emergencies and evidence of past emergencies in the region; and

- The creation of thematic rosters in "new" areas such as urban expertise, where the UN lacks expertise and where inter-agency support would be beneficial.

Collaboration can bring tangible benefits such as greater incorporation of INGOs, Its and NGOs in responses, leading to a better response, access to funding, exchange of ideas, etc., but it can also bring kudos to an organisation. Conversely when things don't go as planned, there is a risk of an organisation being perceived negatively. The TSCP should;

• Identify the risks associated with establishing new mechanisms and mitigate through having a robust understanding of the requirements.

Finally, establishing support to the UN is not without risk of staff leaving their role to work directly for the organisation with which they were previously collaborating. Motivations for leaving can taken many forms, most notably in the form of differential in pay levels between UN agencies, INGOs and NGOs, but also for new challenges, better career prospects, family reasons, etc.

• Recognise that seconding staff into UN operations, may lead to staff leaving to work directly for the UN, and that attrition rates may be higher as a result. UN agencies are not signatories to the Charter for Change and are therefore not bound by the C4C ethical recruitment clause.

Phase 1 Conclusion

There are many examples of mechanisms created in the past 26 years with the express aim of surging more effectively in humanitarian response. The key element to all the mechanisms is the level of collaboration required to make them work effectively. Without partnerships and networks, many of these would have been doomed to failure. But working collaboratively is time and resource intensive, and the level of investment has to be worth the outcome. As stated in the State of Surge Capacity in the Humanitarian Sector report, working collaboratively, especially within federated and membership networks can help avoid duplication, and there are opportunities as the Start Network to cooperate together to achieve this aim.

Some of the most successful mechanisms detailed here, are those which have a secretariat or specialist roster manager, which works in the background to develop the guidelines, maintain standards and to steer progress; managing partnerships is not something that can be squeezed in when time available, but needs dedicated resources.

Deployment of surge staff can broaden an organisation's footprint into areas in which they are not currently operating. Donors are able to capitalise on their UNDAC/SBP/RRT/FST/REGA deployee, not only to improve the performance of the UN, but to also further their understanding of a response, which is useful where donors do not have a presence in that country. INGOs could also benefit from such relationships, if resources would allow. The national and regional platforms of the TSCP have taken the first steps towards making that happen, and identification of redundancy (if any) within INGOs could further facilitate cross organisational surge, where secondees from one organisation bridge gaps and facilitate information exchange and understanding of ways of working between organisations.

Both INGOs and UN agencies recognise that effective surge is not managed through 1 mechanism alone, but through a range of mechanisms, including through partners and through external recruitment. In the INGO community, partnerships in surge are usually humanitarian to humanitarian, for example, where ACAPS and the CDAC Networks' rosters and deployments are managed by NRC. The UN's partnerships are different, whereby the UN's partner are INGOs, private sector, governmental bodies, etc., who provide the UN with surge capacity. An exception to this would be the UNICEF/WFP RRM or the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM); a roster of senior, experience and trained staff capable of operating in L3 emergencies in support of the HCT to define and implement the response.

Throughout this research, there were 2 principal issues which arose, that of financial and human resources which would facilitate progress in surge, both internal to respondents' own organisations and in regard to collaboration with other organisations. What the UN does exceptionally well is to build partnerships in support of its own surge mechanisms to fill the gaps, and the NGO and INGO community step into support, largely at no cost to the UN. Building collaborative ways of working is incredibly resource intensive, which has been a limiting factor for INGOs and which is less of an issue with UN surge mechanisms, where secretariat functions have been funded by donors, partnerships established, methodologies developed and then deployments once more funded by donors. The greatest challenge, as always is a lack of predictable funding and resources to establish and maintain surge mechanisms.

Transforming Surge Capacity – UN/INGO Collaboration – Phase 2

Introduction

Setting up a new surge mechanism, whether an internal mechanism or in partnership with others, requires a focus on many areas, from identification of need, to management, through to review.   This research will investigate 3 mechanisms for INGO support to the UN; UNDAC, Support to the RC/HC/HCT, and within Clusters at a sub-national level. The report will not focus on the individual administrative steps required to establish surge mechanisms, but at specific areas raised by those who would implement each mechanism, both as senders and receivers of personnel. Proposals and recommendations within this section are not meant to address the full set of challenges that face each of these mechanisms, but to suggest small, collaborative projects and pilots between INGOs, IOs and the UN.

The table below includes the generic benefits to organisations collaborating with each other in surge deployments. Further information on benefits within specific mechanisms is detailed in the relevant section.

Benefit to the INGO / IO	Benefit to the UN
Prestige (or disrepute)	Adds operational capacity and perspective
Possible access to funding	Brings fresh ideas to the system
Helps build relationships and trust with the UN	Helps build relationships and trust with the INGO and NGO community
Brings back greater knowledge and understanding of the UN architecture	Enables a more balanced response (UN – INGO – NGO)
Helps influence the system from within	–
Helps INGOs to advocate to NGOs for participation within humanitarian architecture	–

Throughout this research, informants from a UN perspective noted that managing relationships wth individual NGOs is time consuming, and that when INGOs collaborate, such as via the Start Network, their voice is amplified, and management of one relationship with an umbrella group is substantially easier for UN agencies, than managing relationships with individual INGOs. Therefore, this research focuses on establishing partnerships as the Start Network working with UN agencies or clusters, rather than individual Start Network INGOs maintaining separate relationships. As such, the Start Network's Collaboration Principles (see Annex 3) should apply. As a Start Network "offer", collaborative surge would have to ensure quality control in terms of those who surge in as support within any of the 3 mechanisms proposed.

Whilst this study will not look at step by step actions that are needed to establish a roster, it will consider the key points below when considering recommendations on each mechanism investigated.

Need

Is there evidence that this is required? What gap is this intended to fill? Are others trying to do the same thing? Has it been tried and failed before? If so, why?

ToRs

How will the mechanism operate? When will the mechanism operate? Where will it operate? What will it do? How will it be set up? What are the risks? How long will it take to set up? What does success look like? Is it time bound? Does it need an exit strategy?

Funding

Who is going to pay for it? Is funding predictable and sustainable?

Approval

Are stakeholders on the same page? Is there going to be resistance to this initiative? If so, what can you do to prevent the resistance?

Management

Who is going to manage it? How do I communicate with roster members? How do I maintain the database?

People

How do I get the right people within the roster? What competencies do they need? What is the job specification for the roles I require? How do I advertise to candidates? How do I vet candidates?

Training

What training will roster members need? Is that training already available? If not, do I have to develop my own? How would that be funded? How can I ensure that training meets the need? Will the training need a periodic refresh? Will the roster members need training more than once?

Deployment Modalities

How will deployees be deployed? Who pays them? How do they get paid? Who looks after them whilst they are deployed? What about their health and wellbeing? How do I address different ways of working between the sending and receiving organisation?

Monitoring & Evaluation

How will we check it is still relevant? When will we review how it works? Who will review the mechanism? Who will input to review?

Collaboration with UNDAC

There are very few UNDAC roster members who are drawn from the INGO/NGO community, the majority being drawn from the civil protection community. FCSS estimates that only 1 in 4 UNDAC members possess a humanitarian skillset, resulting in UNDAC teams often lacking humanitarian expertise. In addition, UNDAC members from the Global South often lack the funding to deploy.

FCSS obtains expertise through the addition of UNDAC members, via regularly held regional induction courses For organisational capacities and skillsets not available through UNDAC members or OCHA, FCSS develops partnerships which bring the expertise it requires for rapid response, such as mapping through MapAction and DHL for aviation and logistics services. Two options were proposed;

- INGO staff become UNDAC members, supported from internal funds or through their relevant member state

- INGOs discuss a collaborative arrangement with FCSS, whereby INGOs provide 1–2 staff per mission as a bolt on service to an UNDAC Team.

In both scenarios, INGO deployees would assist in needs assessments, situational analysis, drafting flash appeals, helping establish Cluster coordination, or docking into existing sectoral mechanisms and encouraging greater local NGO participation. Benefits of such participation would include early engagement with the UN system for both INGOs and NGOs, as well as possible access to funding. Participation would facilitate a greater understanding of the UN system and vice versa, which deployees would take back to their home organisation.

During the first phase of this research, FCSS had already expressed interest in exploring the opportunity of working with INGOs. This declared interest, combined with FCSS's previous experience in developing partnerships, means that areas for consideration are already well-defined. The TSCP International Platform chose to investigate partnering with UNDAC as a bolt-on mechanism, as opposed to INGO staff becoming full UNDAC members, and FCSS agreed that this option was preferable because INGO participants;

- Would not have to undertake a full UNDAC induction;

- Would be decided upon by the Start Network and be interchangeable with other Start Network staff at the direction of the Start Network

- Would work to discrete and time-bound Terms of Reference (ToRs) that would limit their role and prevent mission creep within an UNDAC mission

In addition, working as a bolt-on mechanism to UNDAC would mean that results are more easily monitored and evaluated, aiding decision making on future support to the UNDAC mechanism. A pilot project for a year would help establish viability of this initiative, and the benefit to both INGOs and the UN.

Benefits of Collaboration with UNDAC

Apart from the generic benefits detailed at the start of phase 2, the following benefits could also be achieved;

- INGOs / IOs can ensure greater field coordination and the incorporation of INGOs, national NGOs and the private sector, etc. within the response);

- INGOs / IOs could support coordinated assessments on behalf of UNDAC and in collaboration with ACAPs and Map Action; and

- Using their technical and operational expertise, INGOs / IOs would help establish Clusters, and support both Cluster and inter-Cluster coordination.

Recommendations for UNDAC Collaboration

To manage INGO deployments alongside UNDAC, the Start Network should;

• Establish interest from Start Network agencies, including the incorporation of INGO staff drawn from the country or region of operation, which is of particular interest to FCSS. Whilst FCSS is not specifically excluding staff drawn from British Start Network agencies, drawing on local staff capacity would meet both the humanitarian and local expertise required;

• Consider issues of representation and authority, whereby staff from individual Start Network agencies would represent the Start Network, as opposed to their employing organisation;

• Approach DFID and other donors with the concept of INGO support to UNDAC, with a view to identifying funding and / or roster management. For example, DFID pays UK UNDAC Member consultancy fees whilst deployed, as well as costs incurred by FCSS in arranging UK UNDAC

Members' travel, accommodation and subsistence. CHASE OT staff manage the UK UNDAC roster on behalf of DFID and may also be able to manage Start Network participation;

• If funding, not available through DFID or other donors, establish how deployments will be funded[32];

• Establish a roster, whereby participant INGOs are on standby for UNDAC deployments for a defined time-period. This would spread responsibility for participating in missions across various INGOs, making participation less onerous, and therefore more practicable, especially for smaller INGOs with less human resources;

• If roster management not available through DFID or other donors, assign a roster manager within the Start Network. In addition to maintaining the roster, the roster manager would be responsible for maintaining relationships with INGOs, establishing duty of care procedures, establishing deployment guidance, facilitating attendance on prerequisite UNDAC training, monitoring and evaluating deployment results, and if, necessary, undertake financial management; and,

• Consider reporting lines for deployees

In addition to considerations for the Start Network, FCSS would also have to;

• Consider amendments to existing or the creation of initial and ongoing training on the UNDAC concept and methodology, considering the geographic spread of potential deployees and limiting participation costs;

• Work with the Start Network to develop a monitoring and evaluation framework for deployments; and,

• Communicate and clarify this concept with OCHA and IASC partners.

Whilst this list of recommendations is quite lengthy, it is representative of how developed the UNDAC system is, its history of establishing collaborative surge partnerships, and where many of the issues raised, have been raised previously. One of the most challenging recommendations is that of roster management, whereby the Start Network would have to identify resources to manage this initiative, which, whilst it could be quite onerous in the initial stages, should decrease through time.

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[32] The UNDAC Advisory Board (February 2016) recommended the use of UNDAC mission accounts on a case by case basis and with prior consultation of the respective UNDAC member country, to support the participation of UNDAC members from participating IOs and NGOs in UNDAC missions.

Collaboration with the RC/HC/HCT

In 2008, the Fit for the Future? Strengthening the leadership pillar of humanitarian reform study suggested that "if UN agencies and NGOs are to make a commitment to supporting leadership through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), then HCs must engage them as strategic partners, and seek to value the diversity that the humanitarian community offers." The study went on to recommended that NGOs and UN agencies should commit to participating in the HCTs at a high enough level to enable them to operate effectively. This section will show that in 2017, there are still challenges to NGO participation, and make recommendations as to whether senior level INGO engagement within the humanitarian leadership team would help ensure better outcomes.

Findings

In order to assess whether there is scope for Senior Level INGO staff to systematically collaborate within the humanitarian leadership team, there must first be an assessment of the challenges which INGO support could address and influence. Fortunately, there is no shortage of research on the challenges surrounding the role of the RC/HC and the HCT in emergencies, including, ALNAP's Improving Humanitarian Coordination, which is a meta-analysis of coordination challenges in HCT coordination, and which identifies a number of reasons for sub-optimal performance of the HCT. The ALNAP study, key informants and other studies focus on HCT coordination as a whole;

- HCT not identifying or agreeing priority issues or common policies;

- The HC and HCT does not have authority over HCT participants and so the strategic plan can be an inefficient burden, nonsensical and mechanical;

- Not providing leadership;

- The Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) dominates, but is rarely used;

- Meetings were poorly facilitated and became a method for information sharing only;

- Slow to take action;

- The range of tools, partners and initiatives is bewildering; and

- Insufficient support within the office of the HC/RC/DSRSG[33] who had multiple roles to undertake.

The pattern of failure is deemed to be that of the RC/HC who is ultimately accountable for response direction. However, each member of the HCT has their part to play in achieving success within extremely complex situations, and the evidence above points to a failure across all entities who participate in HCTs; collective responsibility and mutual accountability is failing.

For the purpose of this research, it is important therefore, to focus on areas within Start Network agencies' influence. In 2013, a report by InterAction entitled "Collective Responsibility; The Perceptions, Expectations And Realities of NGO Coordination In Humanitarian Leadership" examined NGO (both international and national) participation in HCTs and identified the following;

- Knowledge of the architecture and its protocols remains uneven for NGOs;

- NGOs felt they were not treated as equals;

- Participation of national NGOs was insufficient;

- NGOs felt that HCTs were not consistently effective and this led to hesitancy on committing to attendance by senior level staff;

- NGOs participate without fully understanding the HCT, their role and responsibilities. Success is hindered by a limited understanding of roles and responsibilities;

[32] The UNDAC Advisory Board (February 2016) recommended the use of UNDAC mission accounts on a case by case basis and with prior consultation of the respective UNDAC member country, to support the participation of UNDAC members from participating IOs and NGOs in UNDAC missions.

[33] Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

- NGO representatives' profile and personality vis-a-vis the role;

- Ability of one person to represent other organisations;

- Lack of a reliable conduit on decisions;

- Professionalism amplifies the NGO humanitarian voice; and

- A fear that attendance implies endorsement of HCT positions. Other studies[34] found the following;

- There are many examples of when NGOs have not been designated the sufficient amount of seats within an HCT;

- Country level HCTs are not good at facilitating the inclusion of national civil society actors, due to NGOs lack of understanding of the system, the lack of incentives for participation, location and language of meetings, unclear membership criteria and concerns over national actors' impartiality;

- National NGOs struggled with high turnover of international staff and participation in the HCT by national NGOs only improved when the INGOs left. In addition, national NGOs felt they were not trusted and felt that relationships were extractive, and not true partnerships. Filipino NGOs operated separately from the HCT;

- That linking plans and processes and ensuring compatibility of the Flash Appeal, Humanitarian Needs Overview, the Post Disaster Needs Assessment, bilateral and other plans is a huge task; and

- Where emergencies happen in development contexts, NGOs, especially national NGOs, struggle to understand the humanitarian system, and as a result, their representative and representation s not effective.

Considerations

Based on the above, key informants noted that there is definitely scope for senior level NGO staff participation to alleviate some of the issues, and they offered the following for consideration;

- It would be preferable for deployees to be part of the HC pool so that they have same training as HCs and would have a greater understanding of the RC/HC role, however this would need to be considered vis-a-vis the cost and mode of training, which is more on the job training, rather than face-to-face training;

- A decision should be made on the triggers for deployment, to ensure that deployments are predictable e.g. for L3 emergencies, where there is no HC or HCT, or upon request of the RC/HC. Deploying on an ad hoc basis could lead to perceptions of a failing RC/HC/HCT, unless there is a culture change, where requesting help is seen as a positive;

- INGOs and NGOs are best placed to operationalise the response, and a senior level representative could work across INGO/NGOs to make this happen;

- That the role of HC is too much for 1 person and further resources are required;

- Support would be helpful to help INGOs and NGOs to come together and to help them understand the role of the HCT;

- This role would have to be considered vis-a-vis existing NGO forums, or where there is already strong INGO/ NGO membership within the HCT;

[34] Missed Opportunities: The Case for Strengthening National and Local Partnership-Based Humanitarian Responses 2013 http://www.alnap. org/resource/8890.aspx, Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis 2010 www.alnap.org/pool/files/haiti-context-analysis-final.pdf, Opportunity Knocks; Realising the potential of partnerships in the Nepal earthquake response 2016 https://www.care-international.org/files/ files/2016OpportunityKnocksFULLreport.pdf, Real Time Evaluation of the Hurricane Matthew Response in Haiti 2016 http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/ Report_-_RTE_Haiti-MD.pdf and IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/ Documents/Report%20-%20Inter-Agency%20Humanitarian%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20Response%20to%20Typhoon%20Haiyan%20in%20the%20 Philippines%20(1).pdf

- That a collegiate environment needs to exist within HCTs, where all parties have a desire to work through challenges and to reach consensus; if that doesn't exist, then high level support may simply add another element to existent divisions;

- Deployments should not disempower the RC/HC/DHC/HCT, but should be complementary;

- The responsibilities of the deployee within a relatively short deployment of 1-3 months need to be either finite, or a clear handover strategy established, to ensure there is no "drop-off", which can be damaging to the response;

- That support may be better within the RC/HC's office, as opposed to within the HCT, not only to influence, but also due to the restricted size of the HCT and where Country Directors would be prioritised;

- Need to ensure that support enables, but does not replace conversations, so that accountability is not diminished within the HCT, and that the person undertaking the role does not simply become a buffer. HCT members would still need direct access to the RC/HC;

- That maybe this role should be for OCHA to undertake, via a member of OCHA staff who is drawn from the NGO community;

- Deployees into this role should not stay too long, as there is a tendency with longer deployments for deployees to be perceived as taking sides, potentially favouring one or more members' views over others;

- That deployments often create a burden, and whether remote coaching and advice would be more valuable;

- That a well-functioning HCT, does not always equate to a good response. What would success look like in this context and how would the Start Network monitor and evaluate their input;

- With the new HCT Compact being piloted, it may be beneficial for this person to take responsibility for 1 or more areas of the HCT compact in a rapid-onset emergency

Addressing the Challenges — How Could Support be of Benefit?
Informants acknowledged the challenges and agreed that the concept of high level INGO support may help to alleviate some of the blockages and inadequacies. Grouped together, there are 6 broad areas which need to be addressed, and where the Start Network may add value;

1. **Understanding and Clarity**
   - Working with INGO and NGO staff to help them understand the IASC, the HCT, and the roles and responsibilities of actors within the HCT, building capacity for future response;

2. **Bandwidth**
   - Assisting representatives to meet their many obligations within the HCT;

3. **Participation**
   - Working with stakeholders to secure sufficient seats on an HCT for INGO/NGOs, incentivising and ensuring sustained participation of INGO/NGO representatives;

   - Where INGO/NGO consortia or umbrella organisations participate, working with stakeholders to ensure that representatives are also drawn from operational INGOs and NGOs;

   - Fostering trust between INGO/NGO HCT participants and other HCT members;

4.   **Representation**

- Working with the INGO/NGO community to ensure that INGO/NGO representatives are at the right level and "decision makers";

- Working with the INGO/NGO HCT representatives to ensure that INGO/NGO representatives act on behalf of the INGO/NGO community, not just their own organisation;

- Brokering agreements between INGO/NGO members, to reach consensus on areas of concern;

5.   **Prioritisation and Planning**

- In coordination with HCT members, facilitate operational planning, leading to realistic and prioritised actions;

6.   **Communication**

- Working with the INGO/NGO HCT representatives to ensure that information is gathered from, and passed back to the INGO and NGO community;

Understanding and Clarity

To identify whether there is a role for senior level engagement within the humanitarian leadership team, it would first be helpful to clarify the composition of the HCT and each representative's objectives. An ALNAP study entitled "Improving Humanitarian Coordination" from 2016 noted a lack of clarity between HCT roles, inter-Cluster coordination and subnational coordination, resulting in duplication, conflict and actions not being undertaken. The diagram below details the membership and their respective objectives;

The following information on HCT roles is available, which attempts to clarify who does what in an emergency; [35]

- Generic Terms of Reference for Resident Coordinators (2014); [36]

- Generic Terms of Reference for Humanitarian Coordinators (2009);

- Generic Terms of Reference for Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators (No date) Annex 3;

- A reference document for the IARRM (2013); [37]

- Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams (2009); [38]

- Generic ToRs for Cluster Lead Agencies (2010); [39]

- Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response (2010); [40] and

- Checklist for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response (2010). [41]

- InterAction website; [42]

- ICVA website; [43]

[35] https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/UN-Resident-Coordinator-Job-Description.pdf

[36] https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/leadership-and-humanitarian-coordination/documents-public/hc-terms-reference

[37] https://www.icvanetwork.org/node/6427

[38] https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/leadership-and-humanitarian-coordination/documents-public/guidance-humanitarian-country-teams

[39] https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/IASC%20Generic%20ToR%20for%20Cluster%20Leads%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_0.pdf

[40] https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Handbook%20for%20RCs%20and%20HCs%20on%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf

[41] https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Checklist%20for%20RCs%20and%20HCs%20on%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf

[42] https://faqs-humanitarian-architecture.com

Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM) (L3 Only)
Support the HCT towards the goal of an effective and collective International response that meets the actual needs of the affected population within the overall framework of the national response.

Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator/Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)
Leading and coordinating humanitarian action of relevant organisation in country with a view to ensuring that it is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery

HCT Member (UN, IOM, INGOs, Cluster lead agencies and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement)
Ensures that the activities of such organisations are coordinated and that humanitarian action in-country is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues related to humanitarian action.

Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC)
Supports the HC coordinating humanitarian action through strategic coordination, response preparedness and security coordination

There is also some guidance available through the IASC in reference document "12. Recommendations on HCT Representative Arrangements for NGOs[44]" and in the Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams document, but the former is guidance around how many members should participate in an HCT, rather than what they should do, and the latter has 3 points on "responsibilities', the guidance being more about form, rather than function.

As of 2017, a Terms of Reference for the HCT has been developed (see Annex 4), which is being piloted as a compact between HCT representatives, which is more explicit on the actions required of HCT participants, but does not assign responsibilities to individual member types e.g. Cluster Lead Agencies or NGO participants. The ToRs are expected to be amended to form an annual compact which outlines specific mutual responsibilities and actions required to collectively achieve the responsibilities and to increase accountability, which has been lacking to date. In addition, there are 4 areas which are considered mandatory, which the HCT should address through a collective approach, namely ensuring that protection, accountability to affected people, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers, and sexual and gender based violence are all addressed. The compact will be reviewed and renewed annually, to monitor progress for the previous year against roles and responsibilities and to set goals for the following year.

There is at once, a plethora, an absence, a duplication and an outdatedness of information available, which leads to a lack of clarity around participation in the Humanitarian leadership team. HCT members may also be double or triple hatting, undertaking their "day job" as well as performing their roles within the leadership team. In addition, there is no explicit guidance on the role of INGOs and NGOs within an HCT vis-a-vis that of the RC/HC Cluster Lead Agencies or other HCT members. There is no guarantee however, that further guidance would offer clarification in this area.

Whilst updated guidance may clarify to some extent, there is no guarantee that they will reach the right audience, especially as INGO/NGO staff used to development contexts may find themselves operating in an emergency context for the first time. At times, written guidance, even if clear, will fail to embed properly, until fully put into practice. In addition, knowledge gained far in advance of an event, but not practiced, will invariably be lost. Staff will leave organisations and new staff will join and so maintaining a level of understanding would be problematic. Failing to ensure understanding of the humanitarian leadership team's roles and responsibilities early in an emergency could lead to ineffective representation, and this is an area which senior level INGO staff could make a difference, through coaching and guiding of HCT members. The concept of "just in time" knowledge transfer may therefore be appropriate in this context.

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[44] https://faqs-humanitarian-architecture.com

Participation, Representation, Prioritisation and Communication

The areas of participation, representation, prioritisation and communication are linked, in that the challenges could be perceived as internal to the NGO community. They also point to the need for face to face, as opposed to remote support, where building trust is challenging when people have not met their counterparts. In a multi-organisation entity, such as the HCT, where all stakeholders will be working under enormous pressure, trusting others is vital to its success. People tend to trust those drawn from the same arena, be that location, field or organisation, and this is no different within the humanitarian architecture, UN agencies are more likely to trust UN agencies and INGO/NGOs are more likely to trust other INGO/NGOs. Where a senior level INGO member of staff has also undertaken HC training is part of the HC pool, this may go some way to enabling cross organisational trust. However, there is no guarantee that the addition of another person into the mix will assist. For example, the person deployed could be perceived to take sides, seeming to favour 1 or more members' views over others. In addition, there could be issues of authority, where the deployee has no power over HCT members, and so whilst they can advocate, they cannot enforce. All stakeholders have to be open to working together, which is challenging in emergency contexts; collaboration is challenging in "peace-time" and so doing so during emergencies is doubly problematic.

Informants were clear that any support should not undertake the work of INGO and NGO HCT participants, but should act as a broker, and to coach the humanitarian leadership team, so as to build the capacity of responders. Participation should not disempower HCT actors, but seek to guide and facilitate. Success would depend on the senior level staff member being able to coach effectively, and not direct staff, and for parties to be receptive to being coached. Organisations would need to be part of a learning culture, where requesting support at all levels is seen as the norm, rather than a sign of failure. In addition, deployees should not replace direct communication between stakeholders, as doing so would disempower rather than empower.

Whilst incoming senior INGO staff may be technically able to fulfil this role, there are many other factors that could impede success. Ultimately, the leadership team has to be open to such support, and be willing to work together, where in the past, success or failure has been personality dependent. Informants pointed to a lack of accountability, and that everybody who undertakes a role within the leadership team should have their respective role elaborated within their job descriptions and targets, and be measured against those targets by their peers. Doing so, would require a firm commitment from employers to support HCT participants to understand the HCT, their role and responsibilities, where it is not clear that this is happening at present. Such 360 degree feedback is not currently in place, and where it would straddle multiple organisations, implementing it would be challenging.

Bandwidth

Research points to a bewildering and overwhelming range of tasks that need to be undertaken within the HCT, but, where HCT participation is limited on purpose to enable decision making and achieving consensus, resources are stretched between work required as part of the HCT and of participants' organisation. The HC may also be an RC and a DSRSG, and INGO/NGO participants will also be managing their own response. Cluster lead agency representatives are also known to "double hat", undertaking both Cluster work and that of their "home" organisation. There is scope therefore to assist the leadership team to undertake some of the roles required. As with roles outlined previously, this is not without its challenges, as HCT members may feel threatened, or defensive, or could again perceive support offered as favouring one participant over others. In addition, any such support should reiterate that assistance provided is due to capacity, as opposed to capability issues. Different contexts would result in different actions needed, and so there can be no defined terms of reference for this element of support, rather actions would need to be decided upon direction of the RC/HC and/ or in agreement with HCT members.

Location, Location, Location

An additional consideration in this role is where would the person be best placed to respond. Informant views differed on the best location, identifying the following;

- Supporting coordination from within the RC/HC's office;
- Offering remote support of the leadership team;
- Deploying alongside the HCT, but not taking a seat on the HCT;
- Not deploying, but advocating for OCHA to undertake this role; and
- Not deploying, but advocating with INGOs and NGOs on their roles and responsibilities in advance.

Building trust remotely is challenging, and understanding the context is best achieved in the field, which points to a deployment as the optimal solution. However, respondents also pointed to remote coaching being an option, which could also be considered. Whilst a deployment could be short in duration, undertaking a pre-deployment mentoring – deployment – post-deployment coaching arrangement, whereby there is a 3-pronged approach to building capacity may be an option.

RC/HC/HCT Conclusions and Recommendations

Both UN and non-UN informants recognise that there is a need, as evidenced in numerous studies on the challenges of humanitarian coordination, however there is no panacea, as each context will be different. Whilst there are undoubtedly areas that could be addressed through deployment, there are also activities that could be undertaken in advance of a response, and where failure to do so may perpetuate the challenges faced by the humanitarian leadership team;

- The Start Network should advocate for rationalisation, clarification and update of relevant guidance that underpins HCT management and operation. This could include greater clarity and clarifications around the role of INGOs and NGOs within the Humanitarian Country Team, possibly through the creation of stand-alone Terms of Reference, similar to those which exist for the RC/HC, DHC, IARRM and Cluster Leads and where responsibilities support those of the RC/HC in securing appropriate and sustainable participation of INGO and NGOs. All stakeholders should commit/re-commit to the roles and responsibilities established;

- Start Network agencies, and their national counterparts should actively engage with the HCT compact during the pilot, and assume HCT responsibilities as required of the context;

- The Start Network should investigate the concept of engagement in advance of emergencies through INGO/NGO participation in RC/HC retreats, an annual RC/HC – Humanitarian Director meeting and through coaching of responders as part of preparedness activities. This should include working with partners at country level to familiarise local actors on roles and responsibilities during a humanitarian response;

- The Start Network should advocate for INGO/NGO inclusion in the IHP led TRIPLEX exercise[45], with the objective of "testing" UN, INGO, IO and NGO collaboration. The next TRIPLEX is scheduled to take place in late 2019; and

- The Start Network could investigate a funding stream for the development of training / simulations on UN and INGO collaboration, or work with the Humanitarian Leadership Academy to identify ways to improve local NGO and INGO understanding of their roles and responsibilities within humanitarian response.

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[45] IHP organises TRIPLEX, which is a large-scale field simulation exercise, focusing on strengthening preparedness and response coordination. The simulation includes IHP members, OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, the EU, NGOs and the IFRC. More information on TRIPLEX can be found here: http://www.ihp.nu/training

The deployment of senior level INGO staff should be perceived as support, and not attempt to take over roles, and nor should any deployment become an extra level of bureaucracy. Whilst respondents perceived there to be a role, there was no single area which stood out as being an easy win. Whichever way, if any, the Start Network chooses to collaborate with the humanitarian leadership team, there are numerous issues to consider;

- A generic Terms of Reference (ToR) should be developed, in coordination with the Humanitarian Leadership Support Unit and stakeholders in advance of deployment, covering the areas of understanding, participation, representation, bandwidth, communication, as well as prioritisation and planning, and allow for contextualisation upon deployment. The ToRs should not duplicate the activities included within other leadership team ToRs, but seek to be complementary;

- In coordination with the HLSU, the Start Network must identify whether support would always deploy, or deploy upon request only.

- Deployment activities should support and coach members of the HCT, rather than undertake their role, so as not to disempower participants and to build capacity for future response;

- Deployments should consider activities in advance, such as training and mentoring, combined with coaching, both during and post-deployment. There is already an HC mentoring[46] programme managed by the HLSU, which may benefit from senior level INGO staff input;

- The Start Network could consider working with both ICVA and InterAction, in the establishment of this surge mechanism;

- Deployees should either be current members of the HC pool or have been assessed to meet the HC competencies .This could be combined with undertaking some elements of the training/coaching available to HC pool applicants. As Start Network representatives, there will also need to be quality assurance of any staff that deploy;

- Consider the development of Principles of Partnership[47] with key stakeholders; and

- Where an HCT Compact exists, deployees should assist HCT members to review and revise as appropriate.

There should be recognition that there are multiple issues within the humanitarian leadership system, which the deployment of one person during a response cannot solve. Systemic change will be needed around engagement and interaction of HCT organisations, however a mechanism such as this, can seek to influence from within and to radiate out good practice. However, that may take time to embed and each context will be different and where gains may have been made in recent emergencies, there is no guarantee that the next emergency and the next humanitarian leadership team will have made that change. Ultimately, any deployment should be perceived as a common good, in the benefit of the humanitarian community. As with all mechanisms investigated here, the issue of right person, right time, right place and right duration applies, and so the Start Network will need to consider whether they have sufficient quantity of the right staff to support this mechanism.

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[46] https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/HC%20Competencies.pdf

[47] https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment

Collaboration with Sub-National Clusters

Amongst the surge concepts selected by the TSCP to investigate further, was that of INGO support to sub-national Clusters. There is already substantial INGO collaboration at Global Cluster level, who, when required, deploy to assist at a national and sub-national level. Secondees via the Standby Partnership will also deploy to both national and sub-national levels, but there is very little, if any, engagement by INGOs in support to sub-national Clusters. Recent reports from the Global Health Cluster and Global WASH Cluster also point to a need for more appropriately skilled staff at sub-national level.[48] The 2016 ALNAP report, entitled "Improving humanitarian coordination: Themes and recommendations from the ALNAP meeting 'Working together to improve humanitarian coordination" states that "Subnational coordination, which has great potential to improve the effectiveness of operations, is often an 'afterthought', and is particularly under-resourced. Interviewees from Start Network agencies, UN agencies, Clusters, and from the TSCP's own pilot national rosters in both Pakistan and the Philippines, all identified this as an area in which further collaboration with INGOs would be beneficial.

This section will therefore investigate this concept further within the context of the Pakistan and Philippines TSCP rosters, both of which have been hit by devastating emergencies in recent years, and are both now in preparation phase for future emergencies. As influx of International staff is unlikely in level 1 (national) and level 2 (regional) emergencies, this paper will explore the possibility of working within new Level 3 (L3) emergencies, where Clusters are more likely to be activated. This study will take the reflections and recommendations from the Time to Move On (Featherstone, A. 2017) and Time for HR to Step Up (Emmens, B. 2017); National perspectives on Transforming Surge Capacity reports at a global level and from the Pakistan and Philippines roster managers, and will seek to make practical recommendations at a country level for implementing support to sub-national Clusters.

Reflections from the Pakistan and Philippines Rosters

Both the Pakistan and the Philippines TSCP platforms have already established mechanisms for sharing staff between NGOs, and have discussed how staff could be utilised within UN operations, where benefits and challenges highlighted in the State of Surge Capacity in the Humanitarian Sector 2015 report, such as the benefit of responding through local staff or the challenge of coordination and collaboration would apply. Whilst both countries have specific requirements and challenges around supporting Clusters at a sub-national level, there are also areas relevant for both contexts.

One of the key concerns of both platforms was that of unethical recruitment processes by INGOs and UN agencies, whereby NGO staff were seen as a talent pool from which to recruit. Secondment of staff from their rosters into key roles within a response, may expose partner organisations to loss of staff. Both the Time to Move On and Time for HR to Step Up; National perspectives on transforming surge capacity reports addressed the push and pull factors that led to staff leaving their role in their home NGO and being recruited by the UN and INGOs, and whilst employers cannot mitigate against all push factors, implementing this initiative would require seconding organisations in both Pakistan and the Philippines to review staff retention strategies.

A key issue to be addressed is the inequality of pay and other terms and conditions, which was also highlighted as being problematic in other areas of this research, most notably in the Standby Partnership (SBP) and within Rapid Response Teams (RRT), where staff on INGO/NGO salaries are deployed alongside staff on UN salaries. The report, Missed Opportunities; the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses[49], noted that when compared to INGO staff, salaries for local staff can be lower by up to a factor of 10. Furthermore, INGO salaries are generally accepted to be lower than of those within the UN, which would make both INGO and NGO staff vulnerable to higher UN salaries.

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[48] Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring Report 2015 - Global Health Cluster and Partnerships and Resource Mobilisation - A Partnership Review for the Global WASH Cluster

[49] http://www.alnap.org/resource/8890.aspx

In this context, Sub-national Cluster Coordinators and Information Management Officers employed as local staff are generally recruited at level C (National Officer) within the UN system, where annual pay for National Officers or their NGO equivalent is as follows in both locations:

Location	Step 1 (Low)	NGO (Low)	Step 7 (Mid)	NGO (Mid)	Step 11/13 (High)	NGO (High)
Islamabad	USD 45,218	USD 29,257	USD 58,783	USD 34,749	USD 72,348	USD 46,087
Manila	USD 34,890	USD 25,600	USD 48,846	USD 34,158	USD 58,150	USD 47,985

UN data source: http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/pakistan.htm and http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/philippi.htm

NGO pay data source: www.ngolocalpay.net

Exchange rate: PHP 0.02, PKR0.0095

The most senior level local NGO/INGO staff in Pakistan earns approximately the same as the lowest level of UN staff. In the Philippines, a mid-level local NGO/INGO member of staff earns approximately the same as the lowest level of UN staff. In addition, UN staff would be afforded other benefits, not listed here, which would be a substantial pull factor for NGO staff. Where pay and benefits are likely to be a big push factor for staff seconded by NGOs to sub-national Clusters, seconding organisations should review reward systems to mitigate this effect. However, in the context of both Pakistan and the Philippines, where rosters include many different NGOs, this could be challenging, and may even prevent some partner organisations taking part in the initiative. In addition, the difference in pay could be so great, that attempting to meet the pay of UN agencies would be impossible.

Other possible mechanisms to offset staff poaching, were highlighted within the Emmens and Featherstone reports, including the adherence to Principles of Partnership (PoP)[50], organisations becoming signatories or endorsing the Charter for Change (C4C)[51] or the development of a code of conduct/kite mark for INGOs and UN agencies. Indeed, some TSCP organisations have already become signatories to the 8 commitments of the Charter for Change (C4C)[52], but the C4C is an initiative for INGOs and their Global South counterparts, and so does not include UN agencies . Commitment 4 of the C4C states;

"Stop undermining local capacity: We will identify and implement fair compensation for local organisations for the loss of skilled staff if and when we contract a local organisation's staff involved in humanitarian action within 6 months of the start of a humanitarian crisis or during a protracted crisis, for example along the lines of paying a recruitment fee of 10% of the first six months' salary."

As highlighted in both the Featherstone and Emmens reports, this may not be sufficient, where levels of compensation offered may not cover costs, where agreements would legitimise "poaching" and where the lack of institutional memory during a response would be damaging. Emmens goes on to discuss the possible development of a code of conduct/kite mark for INGOs and UN agencies which would prohibit unethical recruitment practices.

A third way to offset staff movement during emergencies, already exists within the Standby Partnership (SBP), where OCHA is bound by UN Secretariat rules which prevents secondees to OCHA, to either apply, or be appointed to posts in the UN Secretariat for a period of 6 months post secondment. Secondees into OCHA sign an undertaking stating their understanding of this legislation. This General Assembly Resolution affects only those organisations within the UN Secretariat. The Pakistan and Philippines platforms could develop MOUs with Cluster partners to specifically prohibit recruitment of NGO staff during a response and/or for a period of time post secondment, however the definition of timeframe for the response may be challenging, and staff may also resent being tied into their organisation post secondment.

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[50] https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment

[51] https://charter4change.org

[52] CAFOD, Christian Aid, CARE, Tearfund and Islamic Relief

Through this research, the issue of resourcing surge has arisen, where many INGOs, at times, lack the human resources for use within their home organisation, and where seconding into other organisations would be impractical, if not impossible. The establishment of the national rosters in Pakistan and Philippines, have been created, in part, to enable local NGOs to share capacity where required, but it is not clear whether the spirit of sharing to UN agencies is universally accepted by all partner organisations, and whether the timeframes required by supporting national Clusters would be practical for partners. Nor is it clear whether additional funding would be required, in either the establishment phase or during emergencies on a cost recovery basis for staff seconded into sub-national Cluster roles. Implementing partners should be cognisant that, as with the UN system, staff seconded into Clusters should not "double-hat", representing both the Cluster and their seconding organisation simultaneously.

The Pakistan and Philippines rosters identified the concept of INGO support to locally led responses as being another way to support this aim, which also resonates with the recommendations from the Featherstone report. Staff from roster partner NGOs would fulfil the role of sub-national Cluster coordinator, whilst incoming INGO staff would support the national NGO's response with staff. Not only would this localise the response to a greater level, it would increase INGO staff's understanding of national level issues. In addition, it would build the capacity of national NGO staff and may as a result, offset some of the push factors that would see staff leaving to join other organisations. As stated in Opportunity Knocks; Realising the potential of partnerships in the Nepal earthquake response, achieving this will require INGO staff to change both their mindset and skillset, in order to work collaboratively.

Neither roster has specifically sought staff for Cluster coordination or information roles and so at present, there is little, if any, understanding whether any of those on the roster would meet the requirements and competencies usually required for Cluster roles. Many Global Clusters have their own training programmes dedicated to effective coordination and soft skills, such as The Global Protection Cluster's Protection Cluster Coordination Training or the Global Education Cluster's Education Cluster Coordination Core Skills Training, in fact the plethora of courses designed by individual Global Clusters and other providers has been an area of concern for the SBP for a number of years, as there is no one size fits all approach for Cluster staff, and sending all candidates on every training in every Cluster, would be a waste of resources.

As part of the TSCP, CAFOD is leading on the development of a training package, designed to equip staff for emergency response. This training package is in the final stages of production and will be free to access. Modules include: Women's Rights, Accountability, Working with Others' Culture and Diversity, and Stress and Wellbeing; an Introduction to Mindfulness. In addition, the Humanitarian Leadership Academy hosts a learning platform which has information and training opportunities available for humanitarian staff globally.

The Philippines

In the Philippines, the On Call roster, managed by Christian Aid is overseen by a Steering Committee comprising representatives from 9 of the organisations within the roster, and therefore any proposal to support Clusters would first need to be agreed with the Steering Committee. The roster was explicitly designed to be a civil society surge roster working in small / medium scale emergencies, not at L3, which is the only context in which Clusters would be activated. However, Christian Aid is currently preparing a business model for the surge roster, which could include a role within sub-national Clusters during L3 emergencies and so exploration of this area of support is timely. The possibility of accessing the On Call roster for WASH specialists has already been discussed within various working groups of the Philippines Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) which comprises UN agencies, NGOs and governmental bodies and so, the concept of support from On Call will not be new information the UN system.

There are currently 412 candidates on the On Call roster drawn from 30 member organisations, and the aim is to have 1,000 people by 2018. Candidates on the On Call roster are offered surge training in soft skills and coordination as part of the On Call roster project. To date 141 people have been trained and others could be trained if more resources were available. The Philippines is a member of the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN), who are currently developing a competency framework for emergency responders within a project entitled, ASCEND, which straddles the areas of risk assessment, early warning and monitoring, prevention and mitigation, preparedness and response, as well as recovery.

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[50] https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment

[51] https://charter4change.org

[52] CAFOD, Christian Aid, CARE, Tearfund and Islamic Relief

Pakistan

In Pakistan, there are 3 organisations responsible for emergency response. The first 2, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) are mostly engaged with policy development and guidelines for emergency response. In Pakistan, Clusters are staffed at national level by the UN, jointly at Provincial level by the UN and INGOs and at district level by INGOs. However, Clusters find it challenging to resource technical specialists at local/provincial and district level and there is an opportunity for support to be drawn from the Pakistan roster.

Benefits of Collaboration with Sub-National Clusters

Apart from the generic benefits detailed at the start of phase 2, the following benefits could also be achieved;

- Deployees could fill Cluster roles at sub-national level, where it is often challenging to obtain staff with the right technical expertise, as well as soft-skills;

- Deployment of national NGO staff into these roles, would facilitate an exchange of knowledge and seek to build trust between the Cluster and national NGOs;

Recommendations for Sub-National Cluster Collaboration

Pakistan and the Philippines
- Identify whether partner organisations wish to support the UN at a sub-national Cluster level. As the rosters are relatively new, partners may decide that it is too soon to expand roster remit;

- If partners are interested in the concept of seconding staff into sub-national Clusters, in collaboration with the HCT, identify which Clusters, if any are regularly in need of support and where roster staff could add value. The duration of deployments may be prohibitive, given that a standard Cluster Coordinator or Sub-National Cluster Coordinator role within the SBP would be for a minimum of 3 months, and often requested for 6 months; The Philippines

- Identify a funding stream through which to support such requests, including the possibility of cost recovery from the relevant Cluster;

- Investigate whether secondments will be stand-alone or whether a formal MOU between the sending organisation(s) and relevant UN agency will be required;

- Identify how deployments will be managed, standard operating procedures, duty of care etc. for staff seconded into sub-national Clusters; and

- In collaboration with the Humanitarian Country Team, assess current members against Cluster role competencies.

Pakistan
- Discuss a role for INGOs within sub-national Clusters with the HCT, the National Disaster Management Committee, the Prime Minister and other government ministries;

The Philippines
- Ensure a robust business case is established within the surge business model currently under development, for approval by the Steering Committee; and

- Assess both existing roster members and future roster members against the ASEAN ASCEND competency framework, as well as those established by the SBP Training Secretariat

The Start Network
- Consider the role of Start Network agencies within a response in support of the Pakistan and Philippines contexts, where NGO staff would deploy into sub-national clusters and INGO staff would backfill their positions within their home organisation.

Sub–National Cluster Conclusion

Both the Pakistan and Philippines rosters are relatively new, and as a result time may not yet be right to diversify roster objectives. Doing so may dilute, instead of reinforce what they are trying to achieve, and so choosing to support in this way should be considered very carefully. These are 2 contexts, and there may be other organisations in other countries that are willing and able to collaborate with the UN in sub-national clusters. The issue of localisation is yet to be grasped fully, including the role of INGOs who have historically dominated the NGO response. If both the Pakistan and Philippines rosters implemented this initiative, how best could the Start Network support local responders.

Annex 1 - Standby Partner / UN Agency Matrix

No.	Partner/Agency	FAO	IOM	OCHA	UNDP	UNESCO	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNHABITAT	UNICEF	UNMAS	UNRWA	UNWOMAN	WFP	WHO	TOTAL
01	Action Contre la Faim, France (ACF)									X						1
02	Australian Civilian Corp (ACC)									X				X		2
03	CANADEM – Canada's Civil Reserve	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	11
04	Care Australian									X						1
05	Catholic Relief Services, USA (CRS)									X						1
06	Child Fund Agreement									X						1
07	Crisis Management Centre – Finland													X		1
08	Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)			X										X		2
09	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	X	X	X	X		X	X		X				X		8
10	Dutch Water Sector (DSS Water)					X		X								2
11	Emercom													X		1
12	Ericsson Response, Sweden			X						X				X		3
13	Estonian Rescue Board													X		1
14	Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)								X							1
15	Finn Church Aid, Finland (FCA)									X						1
16	France Expertise International													X		1
17	German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)													X		1
18	Icelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU)			X						X				X		3
19	iMMAP, France	X	X	X				X		X				X	X	7
20	IMPACT									X						1
21	International Medical Crops, USA (IMC)									X						1
22	Irish Aid			X				X		X				X		4
23	JIPS										X					1
24	Justice Rapid Response (JRR)									X						1
25	Luxembourg Government/ Emergency.lu (Luxemborg)		X					X		X						3
26	MapAction			X												1

No.	Partner/Agency	FAO	IOM	OCHA	UNDP	UNESCO	UNFPA	UNHCR	UNHABITAT	UNICEF	UNMAS	UNRWA	UNWOMAN	WFP	WHO	TOTAL
27	NetHope	X												X		2
28	NGO Consortium for the Global Health Cluster														X	1
29	Netherlands Enterprise Agency (NEA) (NL MFA)							X		X					X	3
30	NRC including NORCAP – Norwegian Capacity	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	13
31	Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)									X						1
32	Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB)							X						X		2
33	Oxfam Great Britain (OGB)									X						1
34	Qatar Charity			X												1
35	RedR Australia	X	X	X	X		X	X		X			X	X	X	10
36	Save the Children Norway							X								1
37	Save the Children Sweden							X		X						2
38	Save the Children UK			X				X		X						3
39	Solidarities International									X						1
40	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)		X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	11
41	Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC)		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X		10
42	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)													X		1
43	Telecoms Sans Frontiere, France (TSF)									X						1
44	The Department for International Development UK (DFID)	X	X	X	X			X		X				X		7
45	Veolia, France							X		X						2
46	White Helmets Commission, Argentina (WHC)		X					X						X		3
47	World Vision International									X						1
48	Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinatze (ZIF)			X												1
	TOTALS	**7**	**10**	**16**	**7**	**2**	**6**	**19**	**4**	**31**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**22**	**7**	**139**

Annex 2 – SBP Training Secretariat Activities and Achievements

- Acted as trainer and facilitator across the SBP
- Developed a Training of Trainers Package
- Developed a Common Induction and Training Package across the SBP
- Developing the concept of a Joint Trainer Pool
- Assessing SBP organisations' training packages
- Developed a training calendar, for training courses open to SBP secondees, offered by SBP organisations and UN agencies
- Developed a competency framework for SBP secondees
- Reviewed minimum standards in safety and security across the SBP
- Began discussions on the development of e-learning courses for use across the SBP
- Compares courses and reviews learning objectives of existing courses, so that the SBP does not reinvent the wheel
- Assists SBP organisations to better their recruitment and induction practices
- Undertakes roster reviews, acting as advisory capacity on L&D needs
- Works with the UN on on-boarding practices

Annex 3 – Start Network Collaboration Principles

COLLABORATION IN THE START NETWORK

Exploring Good Practice

"… We will need to do different things and work together in new ways. Relationships across boundaries – national, cultural, organisational – will be key in rising to this challenge. We will make collaboration central to our action…"

START NETWORK, Declaration of Intent

The Start Network is experimental in a number of ways, not least in its fundamental commitment to collaborative approaches to all that it does and aspires to achieve. Those involved in Start Network (members, donors, staff) make a de facto commitment to a collaborative model as the key to building greater inclusivity, fairness and delivering a practical and sustainable vision of the future of the humanitarian sector.

Over the years, a number of key principles have evolved (through the various working groups for Start Fund and Start Engage as well as those captured in the Start case study series) that seem to underpin emerging good practice. These include:

Respecting diversity and seeking to build alignment and innovation from what makes those involved different as much as what makes them similar

Ensuring that individual agency and / or personal interests do not outweigh or sway **collective interests** and that the best rather than the easiest decisions are made: 'Take one's organisational hat off'.

Striving to achieve **measurable benefits** and **added value** from their association for all those involved

Modelling good **collaborative practice** in terms of behaviour, engagement and transparency

Raising questions or **voicing disagreements** openly with the intention of strengthening rather than undermining the Network or its associated programmes of work

Abiding by **collaborative decisions**

Presenting Start Network's work and vision as fully and faithfully as possible in external situations, and reflecting a view that is in the interest of people affected by disasters.

To deepen the collaborative, experimental approach, it has been agreed that the Start Team will work systematically over the coming months to explore, model and promote these principles in the various work streams and key relationships. This work will be coordinated and reviewed by the Start team's work stream leads and membership focal point, Head of Evidence and in consultation with the Partnership Brokers Association.

NOTES FOR THE START TEAM ONLY:

- Start Network is – and always has been – a highly ambitious collaborative operational model. All those involved are committed to a genuine experimental approach in testing out what it takes to collaborate for efficient, effective and innovative humanitarian action interventions. As an independent entity, this deep commitment to a collaborative model will continue to be central and critical to everything Start Network does and stands for in the humanitarian sector.

- Start Network's commitment to collaboration is not just a question of adopting a current vogue for 'partnering', it is based on a deep belief that this may well be the only way to become prepared and resilient enough to cope with what lies ahead for the humanitarian sector and for humanity.

- Those who become involved in Start Network (whether as donors, members, partners, staff or advisors) make a de facto commitment to collaboration. The principles and values listed overleaf are designed to support and build this commitment and to contribute to setting a standard for such approaches in the sector as a whole.

- This list has evolved from the first 5 years of experience and they now form the bedrock of Start Network in action – they underpin everything the Network does. It can also help to support collaboration at project / operational levels by providing a coherent and global set of collaboration values as well as helping to explain to decision-makers what a commitment to collaboration requires.

- These Collaboration Principles and Values are aimed at individuals rather than organisations – it is hoped that each individual will embed them within their own entities as a natural process of embedding Start Network more deeply both at HQ and field levels.

- Start Network has been assisted in the development of these Collaboration Principles and Values as part of our collaboration agreement with the Partnership Brokers Association (PBA) so they are built on PBA's long international experience of promoting collaboration good practice as well as Start Network's own collaboration experiences to date.

- The list is not fixed or exhaustive, it can be challenged, reviewed and changed when necessary as Start Network's collaboration experience deepens over time.

- The ambition for these principles is for them to evolve into a set of codified collaborative behaviours recognised by the Start Network membership, and that the membership can use to call to account those involved in the Start Network if they fall short of the best intentions that these principles and values represent.

Annex 4 – Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Terms of Reference

Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, COUNTRY/REGION

Draft Terms of Reference

Level: D2

Duty station: XXX

I. ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

Under the supervision of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) is responsible for supporting the HC in coordinating humanitarian action in COUNTRY/REGION. The DHC will serve as HC a.i. in the HC's absence.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES

The DHC, within the limits of the authority delegated to her/him by the HC, and whenever possible in support of, and in coordination with, national and local authorities, shall support the HC in:

Strategic Coordination

- Ensuring consultation with local authorities on matters regarding the planning and implementation of humanitarian assistance and protection in COUNTRY/REGION;

- Ensuring that international humanitarian and human rights law inform the analysis of the humanitarian situation, and that the principles of "Rights up Front" drive the response of the humanitarian system.

- Promoting the application of the IASC Principals of Partnership and Accountability to Affected People, encouraging innovation and substantive improvements in approach by ensuring regular reporting against the strategic indicators of the HRP.

- Expending all necessary efforts to ensure that the HRP is operationalized and implemented in a principled, timely, effective, and efficient manner.

- Promoting respect for international humanitarian and human rights law by all parties, including non–state actors, by coordinating the advocacy efforts of relevant organisations as requested by the HC and using private and/or public advocacy as appropriate.

- Providing, on an ongoing basis, strategic advice to the RC/HC and HCT on humanitarian, security and political developments in COUNTRY/REGION which will impact on the humanitarian situation.

- Promoting inclusive resource mobilization efforts and overseeing CERF grant applications, as requested by the HC.

- When requested, leading day–to–day efforts on behalf of the HC to obtain free, timely, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organisations to people in need, and access to services and assistance by vulnerable groups, by leading and/or promoting negotiations with relevant parties, including non–state actors.

- Expending all necessary efforts to ensure that relief activities lead and contribute to the early as well as long-term recovery of affected people, by cooperating closely with local actors responsible for planning and implementing rehabilitation and development activities.

Response Preparedness

- Ensuring that response preparedness efforts are inclusive and coordinated, by supporting the HC to lead HCT preparedness and contingency planning activities.

Security Coordination

- If requested by the HC, participating in SMT meetings, ensuring humanitarian views are taken into consideration at security meetings, and advising concerned agencies on relevant security procedures, as requested by the Designated Official.

III. ACCOUNTABILITY

The DHC is ultimately accountable to the people in need in COUNTRY/REGION. The DHC reports to the HC and should agree with the HC on a set of objectives and planned outcomes, in line with the HC Compact, and on what each can expect from the other.

IV. SUPPORT

In discharging her/his responsibilities as outlined in these Terms of Reference, the DHC is supported by the OCHA Office.

V. REQUIREMENTS

Competencies

Professionalism: Authoritative knowledge and wide exposure to humanitarian and human rights issues and the UN system; ability to advise senior management and other senior officials on approaches to address highly complex/sensitive issues; conceptual and strategic analytical capacity.

Leadership: Demonstrated ability to provide leadership; strong negotiating skills and ability to influence others to reach agreement on difficult issues; ability to work under extreme pressure.

Judgment/Decision-making: Mature judgment and initiative; ability to assume responsibility for decisions; demonstrated original and creative thinking; independent judgment and discretion.

Managing Performance: Ability to establish priorities and to plan, coordinate and monitor the work of others; ability to motivate, coach and mentor staff and encourage good performance.

Planning and Organizing: Ability to effectively develop work program, direct others in the execution of the program and ensure timely delivery of results.

Communication: Excellent communication (spoken and written) skills, including ability to present and defend difficult positions to senior officials.

Teamwork: Excellent interpersonal skills, including ability to operate effectively across organizational boundaries; ability to establish and maintain effective partnerships and working relations in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity.

Education

Advanced university degree (Master's degree or equivalent) in Political Science, Political Economy, International Relations, International Law, Public Administration, Sociology or related fields. A first level university degree with a relevant combination of academic qualifications and experience may be accepted in lieu of the advanced university degree.

Work Experience

At least 15 years of progressively responsible experience in international development and/or humanitarian affairs and/or the human rights field. Extensive field experience, including at least 5 years in the management and coordination of multi-sectoral humanitarian operations, preferably in a multilateral context, is required. Prior experience serving in the context of a UN peacekeeping or political operation is desirable. Knowledge of the humanitarian system, humanitarian principles, standards and mandates relevant to the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, IOM and humanitarian NGOs is required. Knowledge of international law – in particular International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law, International Human Rights Law – and its application to humanitarian response is required. Professional experience of the COUNTRY/REGION is desirable.

Work Experience

Fluency in spoken and written English is required.

Annex 5 – IASC Standard Terms of Reference for HCTs

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE
STANDARD TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAMS[53]

INTRODUCTION

These standard Terms of Reference (ToR) for Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) are the foundation for developing country-specific HCT ToR that are adapted as necessary. The ToR define the roles and responsibilities for participation and functioning of HCTs. They also reinforce the reciprocal and mutual accountabilities of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and HCT members.

The ToR build on the IASC Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams and the IASC Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator endorsed in 2009. They are also consistent with the commitments of the World Humanitarian Summit and Grand Bargain.

PURPOSE

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is led and chaired by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)[54]. The HCT's overall goal is to ensure that inter-agency humanitarian action alleviates human suffering and protects the lives, the livelihoods and dignity of people in need. As the top inter-agency humanitarian leadership body in a country, the HCT's primary purpose is to provide strategic direction for collective inter-agency humanitarian response.

The HCT makes decisions to ensure that country-level humanitarian action is well-coordinated, principled, timely, effective and efficient. It also ensures that adequate prevention, preparedness, risk and security management measures are in place and functioning.

The HCT is ultimately accountable to the people in need. The affected State retains the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory[55]. Whenever possible, the HCT operates in support of and in coordination with national and local authorities.

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[53] Final draft endorsed by the IASC Emergency Directors Group, February 2017

[54] In the absence of an HC position, the Resident Coordinator (RC). The term 'HC' refers to both RC/HCs and stand-alone HCs.

[55] See UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of December 1991.

ESTABLISHMENT AND DISESTABLISHMENT

An HCT is established in all countries with an HC position. In countries where there is no HC position, an HCT is established when a humanitarian crisis erupts or a situation of chronic vulnerability sharply deteriorates. An HCT is also established to steer preparedness activities, if no other adequate coordination mechanism exists. In countries where there is no HC position, the decision to establish a HCT is taken by the Resident Coordinator (RC), in consultation with relevant operational agencies and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).

The HCT may be disestablished in the transition phase, if and when other coordination mechanisms are considered more effective and appropriate. The decision to disestablish the HCT is taken by the HC or, in the absence of a HC position, the RC, in consultation with the HCT and the ERC.

COMPOSITION

The HCT is composed of organizations that undertake humanitarian action in-country and that commit to participate in coordination arrangements[56]. It should include UN agencies, OCHA, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and, subject to their individual mandates, components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement[57]. The UNDSS Chief Security Adviser will have a standing invitation as an observer to the HCT.

The size of the HCT is limited, to allow for effective decision-making. Membership criteria are clear, generally accepted and well-known. The main criterion is operational relevance.

Members are represented at the highest level (Country Representative or equivalent). In addition to their own organization, members may represent one or more organizations that are not members of the HCT, at their request. An appropriate balance should be sought between representation from the UN and NGOs. Representation from national NGOs should be particularly encouraged and supported.

Representatives of Cluster/Sector Lead Agencies represent their cluster(s)/sector(s) in addition to their organization.

When appropriate, other institutions and agencies may be invited to participate in HCT meetings.

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The HCT function is guided by international humanitarian and human rights law, the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and the Principles of Partnership[58]. Working in support of the HC, the HCT has the following responsibilities:

a) **Provide a shared strategic vision for collective humanitarian action in-country which is set out in a common strategic plan (the Humanitarian Response Plan or equivalent).** The plan should be based on documented needs and integrate cross-cutting issues (for example age, gender, diversity, human rights, HIV/AIDS and the environment) as well as activities in support of preparedness and early recovery. The HCT should:

- Agree on the most effective division of labor to support implementation of the strategic plan, including through an appropriate cluster[59] and cluster leadership arrangements.

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[56] Humanitarian action includes relief, early recovery and protection activities in the response preparedness and response phases in either disasters or complex emergencies.

[57] The components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement attend Humanitarian Country Team meetings in an observer capacity, except the IFRC when it is attending as representative of the country-level convener of the Shelter Cluster. They coordinate with other humanitarian actors to the extent necessary to achieve efficient operational complementarity and a strengthened response for people affected by armed conflict, situations of violence and other crises, as appropriate, according to their individual mandates.

[58] Equality, Transparency, Results-oriented approach, Responsibility, Complementarity. See also ICVA's background and rationale page which explains the Principles of Partnership and provides a direct link to the PoP commitments, https://icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment.

[59] IASC clusters are formally activated clusters created when existing coordination mechanisms are overwhelmed or constrained in their ability to respond to identified needs in line with humanitarian principles. For more information, in particular on when IASC Clusters or Government-led coordination please refer to the IASC Reference Module For Cluster Coordination at Country Level (July 2015); https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda/documents-public/reference-module- cluster-coordination-country-level.

- Ensure the principled, timely, effective and efficient implementation of the strategic plan, including through strategic oversight of needs assessment and monitoring and evaluation.

- Lead efforts to ensure that the strategic plan is sufficiently funded in a timely manner, with the HC and HCT members promoting and contributing to inclusive resource mobilization.

- Provide clear direction on key in-country humanitarian concerns that require common positions in the HCT.

- Monitor implementation of the strategic objectives and ensure corrective action is taken when required.

b) **Oversee the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG), sub-national coordination bodies and other groups that are part of the inter-agency coordination architecture in-country.** This responsibility includes oversight of the implementation of the strategic plan, encouraging joint analysis and inter-sectorial outcome-based programming, ensuring implementation of the response, endorsing in-country positions and responding to requests from these bodies. As appropriate, the HCT will encourage and support decentralization to the sub-national level, including by facilitating two-way information exchange and communication.

c) **Support efforts led by the HC to obtain free, timely, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations to populations in need.** The HCT should:

- Engage in coordinated negotiations with relevant parties, including non-state actors where appropriate.

- Promote respect for international humanitarian and human rights laws by all parties, including contributing to private and/or public advocacy as appropriate.

- Support the efforts of the HC to influence Member States, regional organizations, UN entities, civil society, the private sector, the media and other relevant actors.

d) **Ensure that preparedness and response efforts are inclusive and coordinated.** The HCT should strengthen early warning and preparedness capacity, and enhance synergies and relationships with national and local authorities. These efforts should build on the interface between the HCT and UNCT. Clearly defined commitments and support for engagement of local and national NGOs as strategic and equal partners should also be a priority.

e) **Ensure that the international humanitarian response is coordinated with national, sub-national and local level authorities,** including crisis management agencies, as appropriate.

f) **Support and contribute to efforts to address the humanitarian-development nexus.** The HCT should endeavor to coordinate with development platforms to develop a shared understanding of sustainability, risk and vulnerability, achieve a shared vision for outcomes and facilitate shared analysis and multi-year planning and financing as appropriate.[60]

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[60] See Commitment 10, 'Enhance Engagement between Humanitarian and Development Actors,' The Grand Bargain: https://consultations. worldhumanitariansummit.org/bitcache/075d4c18b82e0853e3d393e90af18acf734baf29?vid=580250&di sposition=inline&op=view, and the UNSG World Humanitarian Summit 'Commitments to Action,' https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/sites/default/files/media/WHS%20Commitment%20to%20 Action_8September201 6.pdf, sets out an agenda for a new way of working by transcending the humanitarian – development divide.

HCT COMPACT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The HC and the HCT are ultimately accountable to the people in need. The HC leads and chairs the HCT and reports directly to the ERC, forming an annual Compact[61]. HCT membership is conditional on a commitment to mutual accountability among the members. Individual HCT Members and their respective organizations, make a commitment to contribute to the HCT as a collective, and to pursue collective outcomes. This contribution should be considered a key component of the responsibilities and performance of country-level operational leadership of each member agency.

Members of the HCT outline specific mutual responsibilities, in an annual[62] HCT Compact, that is developed in country and provides the basis for periodic review of the performance of the HCT. The Compact should set out the important actions required to collectively achieve the "role and responsibilities" mentioned above, as prioritized by the HCT, as well as four mandatory responsibilities:

- A collective approach for ensuring that **protection**[63] is central to humanitarian action, including developing and implementing an common HCT strategy on protection .

- A collective approach to **Accountability to Affected People (AAP)** for engaging with, ensuring feedback to and adjusting the response based on the views of affected people.

- A collective mechanism and approach to **Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) by humanitarian workers,** including a Code of Conduct, aligned with any other mechanisms in place to deal with this issue.

- A collective approach to addressing **Sexual and Gender based Violence.**

MODUS OPERANDI

The modus operandi of the HCT is governed by the **Principles of Partnership**[65]**.** The HCT should be chaired in a consensual and facilitative manner[66]. Membership should be collaborative and constructive.

Meetings are strategic in purpose, focused on clear objectives, action-oriented and produce realistic decisions with clear and agreed follow up.

[61] See IASC Terms of Reference for the Humanitarian Coordinator (2009): The annual compact between the HC and ERC spells out agreed objectives and planned outcomes, and what each can expect from the other.

[62] The compact may be negotiated for a shorter duration if HCTs are established for shorter terms.

[63] As concerns refugees, UNHCR will brief the HCT on the protection and solutions strategy envisaged.

[64] The Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action, Statement by IASC Principals, endorsed by the IASC Principals on the 17 December 2013. Also see the IASC Protection Policy, endorsed by the Principals in October 2016. Available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/protection-priority-global-protection-cluster/documents/inter-agency-standing- committee-policy. The HCT Protection Strategy should be based on the analysis of the protection cluster and members should commit to share information and analysis with the Cluster.

[65] See ICVA's background and rationale page which explains the Principles of Partnership and provides a direct link to the PoP commitments, https://icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment.

[66] In case of an L3 response, the decision-making process and chairmanship style might need to be adjusted in accordance to IASC Transformative Agenda Reference Document, 3. Responding to Level 3 Emergencies What 'Empowered Leadership,' looks like in practice, PR/1209/4175/7 November 2012; IASC Transformative Agenda Reference Document 1. Concept Paper on 'Empowered Leadership,' (Revised) March 2014.

INTERFACE WITH MEMBER STATES, REGIONAL BODIES AND IN-COUNTRY COORDINATION MECHANISMS

While representatives of Member States and regional bodies, including donors, are not members of HCTs, the HC/HCT should ensure regular, consistent engagement with these representatives. It is especially important to ensure proactive engagement in planning, information exchange and strategic discussions with Member State and regional body representatives who do or could provide financial and strategic support for the inter-agency response. A fortnightly, monthly or quarterly HCT-donor meeting is advisable. The frequency will depend on the crisis and HCs/HCTs are encouraged to ensure regular ad hoc engagement as required.

The HC or, in the absence of an HC position, the RC, is responsible for ensuring complementarity between the HCT and UNCT[67]. Building on complementarities is particularly important in the areas of preparedness, early recovery and strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus.

Where a UN Disaster Management Team (DMT) exists at the level of Country Representative, the HC, or in the absence of the HC, the RC is responsible for ensuring complementarity with the HCT.

Where possible, the HCT complements government-led coordination structures and response.

The HCT interfaces with the UN Security Management Team (SMT) as appropriate, with the Chief Security Adviser having a standing invitation to participate in the HCT as an observer.

When a decision has been taken to phase out the HCT, the HC, or in the absence of an HC position, the RC is responsible for ensuring transition of responsibilities to other coordination mechanisms in the country.

List of People Consulted

Abigail Trewin	NCCTRC	Lauren Cheshire	UNICEF
Adrienne Schnyder	SDC	Leonie Tax	ACAPS
Alan Butterfield	OCHA	Lisa Joerke	TSCP Regional Platform
Alexandra Pura	TSCP Philippines Platform	Lisa Sabot	Save the Children
Alan Noble	World Vision	Liz Hughes	MapAction
Andi Kendle	IMC	Marianne Vik	NRC
Andrea Noyes	OCHA, HLSU	Mark Bulpitt	World Vision UK
Angela Rouse	CDAC Network	Miguel Urquia	UNHCR
Assanke Koedam	JIPs	Neil Buhne	Resident Coordinator
Astrid Haaland	UNFPA	Nina Hjellegjerde	NRC
Brendan McDonald	OCHA	Oliver Lacey-Hall	OCHA
Christelle Loupforest	Mine Action AoR	Pablo Medina	IFRC
Claudia Purpura	OCHA, HLSU	Panos Moumtzis	ICVA
Colin Rogers	Plan International	Patricia McIlreavy	InterAction
Cyril Ferrand	Food Security Cluster	Paul LaRose Edwards	CANADEM
Daniela Rahman	CCCM Cluster	Peter Grzic	Independent Consultant
Drasko Kraguljac	RedR Australia	Peter Lundberg	Deputy HC
Eilish Hurley	UNHCR	Philip Upson	Independent Consultant
Fergus Thomas	DFID	Raphael Gorgeu	Director
Gareth Owen	Save the Children	Richard Blewitt	Resident Coordinator

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[67] If the HC is not also the RC, such responsibility befits both the HC and the RC.

List of People Consulted

|			
Glenn O'Neill	Owl RE	Severine Ray	OCHA, HLSU
Henia Dakkak	UNFPA	Shahnawaz Khan	TSCP Pakistan Platform
Helen Barrette	GAC	Shobha Dao	NRC
Ian Norton	WHO	Simon Springett	Resident Coordinator
Jack Jones	DFID	Stephen Cahill	Global Logistics Cluster
Jesper Lund	OCHA	Susanne Brokmose	DRC
Kajsa Nordmark	MSB	Tarik Begic	BRC
Kate Learmonth	Independent Consultant	Ulf Flink	NRC
Kathleen O'Brien	CARE	Venetia Bellers	Independent Consultant
Kristen Knutson	OCHA	Victoria Sukhanova	UNHCR
Lars Peter Nissen	ACAPS	Zola Dowell	OCHA

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ALNAP	http://www.alnap.org/resource/5869
ALNAP	Missed Opportunities: The Case for Strengthening National and Local Partnership-Based Humanitarian Responses 2013 http://www.alnap.org/resource/8890.aspx
ALNAP	Haiti Earthquake Response Context Analysis 2010 www.alnap.org/pool/files/haiti-context-analysis-final.pdf
CartONG	http://www.cartong.org/ngo-overview
CDAC Network	http://www.cdacnetwork.org
Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster	http://www.globalcccmcluster.org/node/93
Charter for Change	https://charter4change.org
Child Protection Area of Responsibility	http://cpaor.net/global-cp-aor-team
Child Protection Area of Responsibility	Review of the Child Protection Working Group Rapid Response Team (CPWG RRT) Report 2012
CHS Alliance	The State of Surge Capacity in the Humanitarian Sector 2015 http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/Resources/Articles-and-Research/Surge-Humanitarian-Report-Final.pdf
DFID	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review 2011 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67579/HERR.pdf
Education Cluster	http://educationcluster.net
Emergency Medical Teams	WHO Emergency Medical Teams Initiative http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/preparedness/emt-info-nov2016.pdf?ua=1
Emergency Telecomms Cluster	https://www.etcluster.org
Ericsson	https://www.ericsson.com/thecompany/sustainability_corporateresponsibility/technology-for-good-blog/tag/emergency-telecommunications-cluster/
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GOARN	http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/goarnenglish.pdf?ua=1
Groupe URD	Real Time Evaluation of the Hurricane Matthew Response in Haiti 2016 http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/Report_-_RTE_Haiti-MD.pdf
IASC	IASC Resident Coordinator Job Description https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/UN-Resident-Coordinator-Job-Description.pdf
IASC	IASC Humanitarian Coordinator Terms of Reference https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/leadership-and-humanitarian-coordination/documents-public/hc-terms-reference
IASC	Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism https://www.icvanetwork.org/node/6427
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IASC	Humanitarian Coordinator Competencies https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/HC%20Competencies.pdf
IASC	IASC Transformative Agenda https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda
IASC	Guidance for Humanitarian Country Teams https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/leadership-and-humanitarian-coordination/documents-public/guidance-humanitarian-country-teams
IASC	Generic Terms of Reference for Sector / Cluster at the Country Level https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/IASC%20Generic%20ToR%20for%20Cluster%20Leads%20at%20the%20Country%20Level_0.pdf
IASC	Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Handbook%20for%20RCs%20and%20HCs%20on%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf
IASC	Checklist for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Checklist%20for%20RCs%20and%20HCs%20on%20Emergency%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf
IASC	12. Recommendations on HCT Representative Arrangements for NGOs https://www.icvanetwork.org/system/files/versions/12.%20Principals%20-%20Recommendations%20on%20HCT%20Representative%20Arrangements%20for%20NGOs%20_12Apr12_.pdf
ICVA	Principles of Partnership https://www.icvanetwork.org/principles-partnership-statement-commitment
ICVA	NGOs & International Inter-Agency Humanitarian Coordination Architecture https://ngocoordination.org/content/ngos-international-inter-agency-humanitarian-coordination-architecture
ICVA	Humanitarian NGO Coordination https://ngocoordination.org/content/humanitarian-ngo-coordination
IHP	http://www.ihp.nu
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